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This paper applies a Chan Buddhist way of life to a truly subjective desire-satisfaction 
view (SDS) to find a way between subjectivism and objectivism about wellbeing. Chapter 2 
opens by surveying the field. With regards to whether some X constitutes our wellbeing, 
subjectivists claim that our endorsement of X is necessary and sufficient, while objectivists 
claim that endorsement is insufficient. This is because subjectivists have metaphysical and 
epistemological worries about claims regarding objective value, while objectivists do not think 
that grass-counters and immoralists have a good life so long as they feel or judge themselves 
to be happy. Neutrally speaking, neither side seems obviously better. Chapter 3 argues that a 
desire-satisfaction (DS) theory which baldly asserts that DS is constitutive of wellbeing makes 
metaphysical claims that a subjectivist might also find worrying, and proposes an alternative 
account wherein DS is reliably connected to feeling and/or judging ourselves to be happy 
(subjective wellbeing). This view, subjective desire-satisfaction (SDS), still presents a viable 
strategy if the worst outcome of DS is indifference, i.e., if one or more of your desires end 
happily, you still experience a net gain in subjective wellbeing. Section 3.4 uses the first noble 
truth of Buddhism, the truth of suffering, to argue that DS is causally connected to suffering, 
specifically from the fleetingness and conditionality of phenomena. Section 4.2 explains Chan’s 
non-abiding mind (無住心), which is essentially a spontaneous state without volitions, and how 
it avoids said suffering. However, it is at least potentially counter-productive, if not unfeasible, 
to deliberately intend to be spontaneous and without volition. Section 4.3 argues that because 
of this paradox of spontaneity, we need a way of life that leads expediently to the non-abiding 
mind. I argue that Hongzhou Chan’s programme of following our everyday desires provides this 
and that the habitual practice of impartial benevolence would also be an expedient means for 
the same reasons. To the extent then that the habitual practice of impartial benevolence is 
neither trivial nor immoral, we have thus connected (although not by necessity) the pursuit of 
our subjective wellbeing and the alleviation of the objectivist’s primary concerns. While a 
necessary connection would be more satisfying to the objectivist, we cannot add necessary 
conditions to wellbeing beyond endorsement without abandoning subjectivism. Conversely, if 
the argument here is sound, then we have tied that which is good for us with the good of others 
without making any assumptions about knowing what is good for us regardless of our feelings 




Note on Translations and Primary Source Citations 
 
The Buddhist primary sources are cited from the Chinese Buddhist Electronic 
Text Association (CBETA) (http://www.cbeta.org) using the abbreviations and 
translations indicated in the table below, unless otherwise indicated in the footnotes. 
Abbreviation English Title Chinese Title Translation used 





BZER Baizhang’s Extended 
Record 
百丈懷海禪師廣錄 in 《古尊宿語錄》卷 1 Luk 1974 
MSGM Master Śubha's Guide 
to Meditation 
無畏三藏禪要 My own 
TPSZ The Platform Sutra 
(Zongbao Edition) 
六祖大師法寶壇經 McRae 2000 
MZER Mazu’s Extended 
Record 
馬祖道一禪師廣錄 Poceski 2007 
HHRD Huihai’s Record 越州大珠慧海禪師 in 《景德傳燈錄》卷 6 Blofeld 1969 
HBCC Huangbo’s Chun Chou 
Record 
黃檗山斷際禪師傳心法要 Blofeld 1958 
HBWL Huangbo’s Wan Ling 
Record 
黃檗斷際禪師宛陵錄 in 《古尊宿語錄》卷 3 Blofeld 1958 
LJRD Linji’s Record 鎮州臨濟慧照禪師語錄 Watson 1993 
 
Since I intend for the argument to be perfectly comprehensible without any 
background in Sanskrit, Chinese or Buddhism (see Section 1.2 for explanation of the 
project goals and methodology), only translations will be given in the main text. The 
original text is included in the footnotes, cited using the following convention: 
 
[Translation where absent in the main text] [Translation used, page number] 
[Original text from CBETA] [Abbreviated title] [CBETA Tripitaka collection 
volume number : Sutra number] [Page-column-line] 
 
For example: 
“If you empty your minds and sit in quietude, this is to become attached to the 
emptiness of blankness” McRae 2000, 29. 「第一莫著空，若空心靜坐，即著
無記空。」TPSZ, T48:2008, 350a28. 
 
In addition, the Sanskrit or Chinese for key Buddhist terms are given in the main text 
in parenthesis. But, again, the argument can be understood perfectly without 







1.1. Subjectivism versus Objectivism about wellbeing 
 
In the aptly titled The Happy Immoralist, Steven Cahn puts forth the case of 
Fred who is as thoroughly treacherous as he is rich, celebrated and renowned for his 
probity. Cahn argues that we have difficulty admitting that Fred is thoroughly happy 
only because “we do not wish to see shallowness and hypocrisy rewarded”. From 
Cahn’s perspective, Fred is indubitably happy.1 Conversely, for Jeffrie Murphy, Fred 
is only happy if we understand happiness as “the ignorant world understands 
happiness”. In the equally apt The Unhappy Immoralist, he argues that once we 
adopt a fuller conception—for instance, one associated with the ancient Greek notion 
of eudemonia—then clearly Fred lacks many of the key attributes of someone who is 
truly leading the good life. 2 Thus, Fred’s happiness hangs on a definition.  
Neither Cahn nor Murphy spells out his conception of the good life, but we 
can tease it out for each. According to Murphy, Fred is only “happy in some limited 
way—for example, enjoying a great deal of pleasure” but “he cannot be happy in the 
full sense”. For Murphy “full human happiness is to be understood as the satisfaction 
one takes in having a personality wherein all elements required for a fully realized 
human life are harmoniously integrated”.3 For Cahn, Fred is happy simply because 
“Fred is wholly contented, suffering no worries or anxieties. Indeed, he is smug, as he 
revels in his exalted position.”4 In other words, for Cahn, Fred’s feelings and attitudes 
are sufficient (and perhaps also necessary) conditions for his happiness. Until further 
examination, let us label Cahn a subjectivist. Since the term “happiness” tends to 
                                                     
1 Cahn, “Happy Immoralist”. 
2 Murphy, “Unhappy Immoralist”. 
3 Ibid., 11. 
4 Cahn, “Happy Immoralist”, 1. 
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have subjective connotations, let us adopt a more neutral term—wellbeing, so as not 
to beg the question. On Murphy’s view, our feelings and attitudes are insufficient for 
wellbeing. Let us label Murphy an objectivist for now. Therefore, we can see that the 
subjectivism and objectivism debate is really about the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for something to constitute our wellbeing. 
My goal is to find a way of life that helps subjectivism handle happy 
immoralist cases. Basically, I argue that Chan Buddhism (more popularly known by 
its Japanese variant Zen) provides a way of living that fixes a major problem for a 
truly subjective desire-satisfaction view. I have picked Chan, Hongzhou Chan in 
particular, from the myriad answers on how best to live because their way of life—
“ordinary mind is the way”—as one might expect from its name, focuses on our 
ordinary everyday lives. When the reasons that make this ordinary life a good life are 
distilled and applied to the habitual practice of impartial benevolence, I would have 
connected in a commonly relatable manner, not by metaphysical supposition but by 
sheer prudence, the conditions of one’s subjective wellbeing and a plausibly morally 
permissible way of life. 
But I can do the above only if the concept of wellbeing and the differences 
between subjective and objective theories of wellbeing are clear. Chapter 2 thus 
provides a top-down analysis of conceptions of the good life. Section 2.2 begins with 
the two principal types of conceptions of the good life, which roughly tracks the split 
between normative ethical theories and theories of wellbeing. While the former is 
concerned with the most virtuous life, the latter is concerned with the most beneficial 
life. This paper is concerned solely with the latter.  
Nonetheless, this clarifies what wellbeing consists in only to the extent that 
we understand that which is truly good for us. Traditionally, there are three classes of 
such theories. Mental state theories (MST) equate wellbeing solely with certain 
mental states, most notably pleasure. Desire-satisfaction theories (DST) equate 
wellbeing with the attainment of desired states of affairs, regardless of whether 
pleasure accompanies such attainment. Objective list theories (OLT) equate 
wellbeing with the attainment of a list of things that are good regardless of whether 
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the individual desires them or finds pleasure in their attainment. According to Shelly 
Kagan, the traditional classification mistakenly categorizes MST as falling outside the 
DST and OLT divide and hence should be replaced with a distinction between 
subjective and objective theories. 5  However, Kagan stops short of defining 
subjectivism and objectivism. I propose in Section 2.3 that subjectivism is a view 
wherein one’s feelings or evaluations towards x are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for x to constitute one’s wellbeing, and objectivism is a view wherein one’s 
feelings or evaluations towards x are insufficient for x to constitute one’s wellbeing, 
some additional objective element is also needed. 
We shall see that the subjectivism and objectivism debate is ultimately a 
stalemate. On one hand, the subjectivist doubts the objectivist’s claim to have found 
things that are valuable for someone even if he or she disagrees. This has to do with 
metaphysical and epistemological worries surveyed in Section 2.4 about justifying 
claims that there are irreducibly intrinsically good things for an individual. On the other 
hand, the problem with subjectivism according to objectivists covered in Section 2.5 
concerns the implication that people have equally good lives as long as they are 
equally pleased with their lives. Objectivists doubt that someone who is happy merely 
counting the grass in a field daily, or who is happy being resolutely immoral, lives as 
good a life as a devoted philanthropist, for instance. If the argument in Section 2.5 is 
sound, subjectivists have difficulty maintaining a subjective account of wellbeing, 
while admitting agent-independent standards of goodness that exclude happy grass-
counters and immoralists from having subjectively good lives. Neutrally speaking, 
neither subjectivism nor objectivism seems to have the upper hand. 
Since objectivists cannot admit that our feelings and attitudes about x are 
sufficient for x to constitute our wellbeing, while subjectivists cannot admit conditions 
beyond endorsement without surrendering theirs, reconciliation would definitely 
require that someone make a concession. Since I have little confidence in solving the 
metaphysical and epistemological worries accompanying objectivism, I will not 
                                                     
5 Kagan, “Limits of Wellbeing”, 187-189. 
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attempt a defence of objectivism. That said, the objectivist need not be against 
endorsement as a necessary condition for wellbeing, the objectivist is against its 
sufficiency, and thereby its allowance of happy grass-counters and immoralists to 
have good lives. The problem is that subjectivism by definition cannot allow for other 
conditions, such as rationality or virtue, to be necessary for wellbeing. My proposal is 
to instead find a way of life that causally connects an admissible subjectivist view with 
the habitual practice of impartial benevolence. To the extent that such a way of life is 
non-trivial and non-immoral, we can alleviate the objectivist’s main concern about 
subjectivism’s allowance of happy grass-counters and immoralists, even though we 
cannot fully answer it, because this is not a necessary connection. This is what Chan 
offers. 
But I first need to have an admissible subjectivist theory. In Section 3.2, I 
revisit DST, which is the leading subjective theory (at least according to Kagan). I 
introduce a dilemma concerning Dead Sea apple cases (DSAs): cases where we 
attain our desire only to be disappointed. The first horn of the dilemma has DST 
avoiding DSAs only via metaphysical commitments which a subjectivist might find 
worrying. Since I am taking on board the objections against DST’s brute assertion 
that desire-satisfaction constitutes wellbeing, I will instead consider two ways to justify 
the privileged position of desire-satisfaction in our wellbeing. In section 3.3, I draw 
from the Buddhist doctrine of non-self to argue against a metaphysical and/or causal 
relation between your desires and what makes you you, in virtue of which your 
desires have the property of constituting or tracking your level of wellbeing.  
The second way to justify the privileged position of desire-satisfaction is to 
posit a reliable connection between desire-satisfaction and subjective wellbeing. Let 
us call this view Subjective Desire Satisfactionism (SDS). SDS avoids the first but 
runs into the second horn of the DSA dilemma. If DSAs merely suggest that desire-
satisfaction sometimes led to an indifferent outcome, seeking subjective wellbeing 
through desire-satisfaction is still a viable strategy; so long as one or more of your 




Section 3.4 borrows from the first noble truth of Buddhism, the truth of 
suffering, to argue that desiring is causally connected to suffering. Buddhism 
identifies three varieties of suffering.6 The first includes visceral pain but also the 
psychological suffering which results from desire frustration. These seem at most 
indirectly connected to desire-satisfaction. I shall concentrate on the other two 
varieties, the suffering that comes from the fleetingness of phenomena (SOF) as well 
as the conditionality of phenomena (SOC). Fleetingness entails that every desirable 
state of affairs can and will pass, if nothing else simply because we too shall pass. 
Conditionality emphasizes the dissatisfactory gap between the object-of-desire and 
the conditions attached to obtaining and maintaining states of affairs. According to 
Buddhism, objects-of-desire do not exist in reality. They are concepts reified, that is, 
bundles of pleasure inducing properties—shiny chassis, smooth leather, growling 
engine, proud emotion and so on—which we mentally combine into a unified and 
distinct existence labelled “car”. A concept, even one that has been reified, is 
unconditioned. This means there are no or at least negligible conditions attached to 
its arising and continued existence, we merely have to mentally summon it and 
continue to do so. We would like to possess this desired object at will as well, but in 
reality (at least according to Buddhism), there are only states of affairs. For a state of 
affairs to obtain and continue, certain conditions need to be met and continue to be 
met, else the paint dulls, the engine fails, and enthusiasm wanes. In this way, the 
psychology of desire-satisfaction is causally connected to suffering. 
In the final chapter, I show how the Chan way of life helps SDS to avoid SOF 
and SOC. Section 4.2 explains Chan’s notion of the non-abiding mind (無住心), 
where states of affairs enter and exit our consciousness without us dwelling for a 
moment on any one, such that even if one perceives an object one does not make a 
value judgement. You might think of it as a state of spontaneity. In this state, one 
does not form value judgements. Without the valuing of sensations, one also does not 
                                                     
6 Generally, I identify as Buddhist any school of thought which subscribes to the 
doctrinal framework known as the Four Noble Truths. I recognize that claiming that 
some doctrine is generically Buddhist is relatively controversial. I will touch on this 
further in the next section. 
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form thoughts directed at the realization of some unconditioned bundle of valued 
properties reified into an object-of-desire. Without such thoughts, one does not suffer 
from the gap between unconditioned object-of-desire and conditioned reality. Since 
one’s mind is in a non-judgmental state, one also does not find changes in states of 
affairs to have foiled one’s desires. Therefore, one avoids SOC and SOF. 
Section 4.2 explains the mental state that avoids SOC and SOF, Section 4.3 
completes the solution by explaining the way of life that leads to this state. Chan 
needs a way of life that leads expediently to the non-abiding mind because it is at 
least potentially counterproductive, if not unfeasible, to deliberately intend to be in a 
spontaneous state absent of volition. I argue that the way of life proposed by the 
Hongzhou school of Chan Buddhism, which emphasizes singular attention to our 
daily affairs, because of the inherent automaticity of our mundane desires, is well-
suited to be an expedient means to the non-abiding mind. That said, the diversity of 
our daily lives allows for a multitude of different ways of living while practicing singular 
attention to our daily affairs. Why then must Chan monks strictly and routinely adhere 
to codes of personal morality and social etiquette? One possible explanation is that 
moral conduct, such as the habitual practice of impartial benevolence, has certain 
features which make it a good candidate for an expedient means to the non-abiding 
mind. Conversely, the selfish pursuit of one’s interests over those of others is 
antithetical to the non-abiding mind. To the extent then that the habitual practice of 
impartial benevolence is neither trivial nor immoral, we have thus connected the 
pursuit of our subjective wellbeing and the alleviation of the objectivist’s primary 
concerns. 
 
1.2. A note on the nature of the project 
 
In the sense that it addresses a debate about how wellbeing should be understood 
and its intended audience is someone interested in that debate, this work is primarily 
a contribution to the analytic philosophy of wellbeing. But it has certain ingredients 
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that are foreign to that debate as generally conducted. I am introducing a generic 
Buddhist concern, about the roots and remedies of suffering, into the debate about 
wellbeing to generate a fresh problem to which I then apply a solution extracted from 
a specific strain of Chinese Buddhism. I think this is legitimate because the Buddhist 
thesis that desire-satisfaction is causally connected to suffering poses a genuine 
problem for SDS, and the Chan way of life has distinct merits (and of course, 
disadvantages) in helping SDS address genuine objectivist concerns. In this sense, 
the project is not primarily about Buddhism or Chan doctrine. An analytic philosopher 
is just as well equipped as a Buddhologist (or even better equipped in terms of having 
no standing inclinations towards Buddhism) to assess the extent to which the claims 
made regarding desire-satisfaction and suffering in Section 3.4 are true. The same 
could be said for the extent to which the mental state described in 4.2 and the way of 
life outlined in 4.3 that leads up to that mental state truly helps SDS solve the 
problems described in 3.4, as well as the objections raised against subjectivism in 
Section 2.5. Nonetheless, since I am employing a so-called “generic Buddhist 
concern” and “Chan way of life”, some explanations are in order. After all, one might 
wonder to what extent is my identification of the mentioned doctrine or way of life as 
Buddhist or Chan sound, or whether they imply any defensible interpretation of the 
complex phenomenon we call Buddhism. 
By what I have called the “Chan way of life” above, I mean a certain set of 
ideas that can be derived from texts associated with the Hongzhou lineage of Chan 
(洪州宗). Here, I draw predominantly from the records of founder of this lineage, 
Mazu Daoyi (馬祖道一) (709-788), his first generation disciples Baizhang Huaihai (百
丈懷海) (749-814) and Dazhu Huihai (大珠慧海) (fl. 788), and his second generation 
disciple Huangbo Xiyun (黄檗希運) (d. 855).7 In extracting this strain of thought and in 
                                                     
7  Dates are taken from Jia, Hongzhou School. I make some supplementary 
references to the record of Linji Yixuan (臨濟義玄) (d. 867). Linji is only distantly 
related to Mazu (a third-generation disciple at best) and his record was compiled over 
two hundred and fifty years after his death. For the historical development of Linji’s 
record see Welter, the Linji Lu, 107-126. As per McRae’s second rule of Zen studies 
(“lineage assertions are as wrong as they are strong”), the traditional Chan genealogy 
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calling it Hongzhou Chan, I take the lead from experts in this field, most notably Jia 
Jinhua and Mario Poceski, in the sense of following the texts and reconstruction 
therein.8 The two scholars largely agree on the main contours of the strain of thought 
which I attribute to Hongzhou Chan, which is the way of life that is often called the 
ordinary mind is the way (平常心是道).9 
In deriving an account of what I have called the “Chan way of life” from the 
above texts, I am not, however, claiming that the Hongzhou lineage is definitive of 
Chan. Chan, if understood as a reified unity, simply does not exist—no set of persons, 
texts or doctrines is definitive of Chan as a whole. To draw on an analogy more 
familiar to Western readers, Chan lacks the orthodoxy and central authority of the 
Catholic Church. Perhaps Chan is more like Protestantism wherein each 
denomination is loosely characterized by association with certain historical 
personages and emphasis on certain doctrines, for instance, as Methodism is 
associated with John Wesley and the doctrine of charity, or Presbyterianism is 
associated with John Calvin and his Reformed Theology. But even this analogy might 
obscure more than it illuminates. With the notable exception of Japan’s Rinzai-Soto 
split, Chan monasteries neither self-consciously organize into denominations nor 
differ greatly if at all from one another. Instead, Chan monks are foremost identified 
by the zong (宗)—loosely speaking, “schools”, or “lineages”—with which they are 
associated. This primarily refers to the succession of Chan masters to which one 
belongs. So, to repeat: in focusing on the Hongzhou lineage, I am not claiming that it 
is definitive of Chan. The lineage represents one particular strain within Chan, and to 
that extent, it has no more or less of a claim to be Chan as ideas from rival lineages. 
Now, advocates of the various Chan lineages adopted elaborate genealogies 
to establish a direct line of transmission outside the sutras (教外別傳) allegedly 
                                                                                                                                           
of the Five Houses overstates (or outright fabricates) Huangbo’s mentorship of Linji, 
precisely because there is a perceived doctrinal inheritance traceable to Hongzhou. 
See Jia, Hongzhou School, 111-118. Nevertheless, I recognize that the historicity of 
Linji’s record and link to Hongzhou are dubious. Hence it is solely illustrative, to 
complement rather than to argue for the point. 
8 See Jia, Hongzhou School., Poceski, Ordinary Mind as the Way. 
9 See Jia, Hongzhou School, 67-72., Poceski, Ordinary Mind as the Way, 182-186. 
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tracing back to the Buddha. But as modern scholars of Buddhism point out, these 
genealogies are better understood as political manoeuvres to downgrade the 
authority of other Buddhist strains—such as Tiantai (天台) and Huayan (華嚴)—and 
promote the Chan masters’ supposed reception and preservation of the Buddha’s 
true teaching. This means that Chan schools or lineages are less historically accurate 
genealogies and more groups united by certain shared beliefs and practices credited 
to key founders. 10  Hence, as per McRae’s second rule of Zen studies, “lineage 
assertions are as wrong as they are strong”.11 This means that, ironically, lineage 
claims are more noteworthy, especially in terms of pointing to declared doctrinal 
inheritance, if its historicity is dubious.12 In light of the above, it is thus important to 
emphasize that my deriving an account of what I have called the “Chan way of life” 
from texts of the Hongzhou lineage is not meant to entail any claims regarding the 
factual historicity of its genealogical claims. The focus is on the doctrinal coherence of 
the ideas associated with the lineage.  
Apart from specifically Hongzhou Lineage Chan ideas, I also make reference 
to the Buddhist doctrine relating to suffering. In bringing these ideas into discussion, I 
am implying that Chan in all its diversity is itself a variant of a more generic Buddhism. 
Specifically, I claim that, as with other variants of Buddhism, Chan subscribes to the 
doctrinal framework known as the Four Noble Truths, and that the Chan way of life 
can be understood as one among many Buddhist theories about the how and what of 
enlightenment, where enlightenment means the cessation of suffering.13 This is why 
                                                     
10 McRae, Seeing through Zen, 2-5. 
11 Ibid., 8. 
12 Poceski describes it in this intimately relatable fashion: “It might be best to read 
statements about lineage affiliation during the mid-Tang period primarily as indicative 
of personal connections that highlighted an individual monk's spiritual pedigree. In 
that sense they are somewhat analogous to contemporary statements that, for 
example, Professor X was a student of Professor Y from Z University, a founder of 
the U school of social anthropology, which establishes Professor X's personal 
connection with his mentor and situates him within the larger intellectual and 
institutional contexts.” Poceski, Ordinary Mind as the Way, 104. 
13 For an explanation of Chinese Buddhism especially Chan’s doctrinal inheritance 
and deviation from earlier Buddhist doctrines see Park, How Buddhism Acquired a 
Soul, 151-222. Some Japanese Buddhist scholars disagree however that Chan is 
Buddhist and shares the framework of the Four Noble Truths. Principally they claim 
that the Chan doctrine of original enlightenment is antithetical to Buddhism. See 
10 
 
the Chan prescription is suitably applied to the problem suffering poses for SDS. 
Similarly, the reference to the Platform Sutra in Section 4.2 is meant to help the 
reader understand the basic cognitive mechanics of said cessation. While I could 
have reconstructed this from the same Hongzhou texts, its presentation in the 
Platform Sutra is more straightforward. Furthermore, this way of proceeding captures 
doctrinal developments between the more generic Buddhist framework covered in 
Section 3.3 and 3.4 and Hongzhou’s solution in Section 4.3, developments which 
have been folded into Hongzhou.14  
Despite all this, something appears questionable about my very endeavour. 
To make Chan and Buddhist texts pliable to the debate about wellbeing, I often need 
to relate them to concepts in analytic philosophy. The nature of this endeavour leaves 
me with little space (or need) to explain the greater context of the works or their role 
in the history of Buddhism. For example, many of the texts, such as the Platform 
Sutra, are also polemical tools for selling the doctrinal position of particular monks 
and hence elevating their position over rival factions.15 In putting aside this context, I 
effectively amalgamate the many different voices and vested interests associated 
with a text into a single doctrinal message, as if the text was no different from the 
analytic journal articles discussed alongside it. One of the greater costs of doing so is 
our having to set aside a sense of the speech-act quality of religious language, that is, 
the reader loses a sense of how the text functioned as a literary device—its genre, 
trope, performance, and most of all, how it is sometimes meant to seduce rather than 
convinced the reader into believing its often fictitious claims. 16  Readers that are 
                                                                                                                                           
Swanson, “Zen is not Buddhism”. While I do believe that Chan does share the 
framework of the Four Noble Truths and is in that limited sense Buddhist, my 
argument does not turn on this. At worst, we can separate and independently assess 
the Buddhist and Chan parts of the argument. 
14 For an overview of these doctrinal developments and the role of the Platform Sutra 
see McRae, Seeing through Zen, 45-73. The following chapter (74-100) outlines their 
further development in Hongzhou and its descendants. 
15 For a discussion of the politics and history behind the Platform Sutra see Schlütter, 
“Transmission and Enlightenment in Chan Buddhism”. 
16 Arguably, Chan texts are fundamentally un-philosophical. In the sense that they are 
not putting forth propositions for public discussion but instead privatizing truth and 
authority, which by definition prevents public access to and claim to possess these 
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familiar with and/or interested in the history, philology and narrative dimensions of 
these texts would certainly find this to be an unacceptable cost, and would find it 
additionally regretful that I have neglected many of the excellent scholarly works in 
this area.17 
It is with the utmost respect to these readers and scholars that I tread lightly 
just beyond the boundaries of their domain of expertise. I can only point to their 
research where space and argument allows. Otherwise, I can only ask the reader to 
keep the nature of my project in mind: I am seeking to use certain ideas derivable 
from (or if you find this objectionable, “inspired by”) Chan Buddhism to attempt a fresh 
angle to an otherwise contemporary debate regarding the nature of wellbeing, and I 
may sometimes need to explain these ideas in terms that are more contemporary and 
more genial to the debate. In the words of Mark Siderits, 
What I propose to do is borrow tools from next door to fix some things in this 
house… Someone might complain that what I am using as a pipe wrench 
was never intended as such. Two questions might be raised in response. 
First, will such use warp the tool? That is, will using the tool in this way 
seriously distort our understanding of the role it plays in its home context? 
Second, must those who borrow their neighbors' tools first master and then 
recite the complete ethnography of the house next door before they may use 
their tools? 18 
 
I acknowledge that in approaching Chan texts from an angle alien to the 
tradition (as such is revealed to us by modern critical historical studies of that 
tradition), I might indeed distort their unique philosophical approach, which I might 
even have otherwise brought to bear on the issues at hand. For instance, I may have 
lost the opportunity to use Chan’s literary tradition as a framework for analysing the 
debate about the good life, and even the analytic tradition as a whole. After all, Chan 
as a literary tradition that endeavours to transcend language and categories may well 
be in a unique position to use the written word to question the very inadequacy of our 
categories of the good life. It may also be well equipped to use language as a 
speech-act to force the reader into new insight, not just through rational 
                                                                                                                                           
goods. See Chapter 6 of Cole, Fathering Your Father, for an excellent example of 
such a case. 
17 For a brief summary of the developments in critical Chan studies after Yanagida 
Seizan see Robson, “Formation and Fabrication”, 322-325. 
18 Siderits, Empty Persons, xiii. 
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argumentation but through the reader’s complete experience of the narrative. In 
choosing to re-frame Chan ideas to fit the analytic tradition, I am foregoing these 
possibilities. But as the saying goes, one door opens as another closes. While 
granting the legitimacy and profitability of other possible approaches, I do think that 
my appropriation of the Chan-angle does shed some new light on the contemporary 
debate about wellbeing. Hence, I can only seek the reader’s indulgence for now—to 
move “Zen-like” beyond distinctions between Chan and not-Chan.  
1.3. Concept and Conceptions 
 
In preparation for the discussion of conceptions of the good life, I have to 
explain how I know that two theories are equally conceptions of the good life and 
what concern is at the heart of this concept. Let me defer to the way that Rawls drew 
the distinction (applied to justice) early in A Theory of Justice: 
Men disagree about which principles should define the basic terms of their 
association. Yet we may still say, despite this disagreement, that they each 
have a conception of justice. That is, they understand the need for, and they 
are prepared to affirm, a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic 
rights and duties and for determining what they take to be the proper 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. Thus it seems 
natural to think of the concept of justice as distinct from the various 
conceptions of justice and as being specified by the role which these different 
sets of principles, these different conceptions, have in common.19  
 
An alternative way to frame this passage is to ask—how do we know that 
interlocutors are disagreeing about what is just rather than talking at cross-purposes? 
Rawls said that we know this because even though the interlocutors disagree about 
the content of the principles of justice, there is contextual consensus given by 
agreement on what is at stake in the debate, which is the role that rival principles 
serve in common. In this case, it is the assigning of basic rights and duties and the 
determination of the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation.  
                                                     
19 Rawls, Theory of Justice, 5. 
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One might further explain this contextual consensus as such: for theories j1 
and j2 to be conceptions of justice, the theories have to agree about what is at stake 
in the debate and be co-referential. The latter has two interrelated conditions. First 
both theories must be talking about the same class of things; j1 cannot be talking 
about a member of the Supreme Court and j2 about a principle. But belonging to the 
same broad class may be insufficient for co-referentiality when it comes to a narrow 
discussion. For example, both may be discussing political principles but j2 seeks to 
assign the fruits and labours of social cooperation while j1 seeks to prevent the law 
executing branch of government from usurping the law making branch. I cannot make 
an adequate argument for the necessary level of class specificity here but I can 
suggest a key indicator in my discussion of the second condition. 
The second condition is a shared understanding of key terms. Take the term 
“just” in the sentence “institution T is just”. For this ascription to be appropriate T 
cannot fulfil its role in any old manner. In the same way that fashion as in “that’s a 
fashionable bag” could mean that said bag is in vogue or stylish but certainly not 
outmoded, ugly or adaptable (as in “he fashioned a vase from the clay”), justness 
when predicated of certain things like institutions has a certain semantic field such 
that not any way of assigning basic rights can be called just. Rawls defines an 
institution as just when “no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the 
assigning of basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance 
between competing claims to the advantages of social life.” 20  In other words, 
predicating justness of T is saying that T defines the basic terms of our association in 
a way that makes no arbitrary distinctions and determines a proper balance. Gilbert 
Ryle would describe j1 as making a category mistake if it were to take Rawls’ 
definition of justice to be applicable to persons in the Supreme Court or principles of 
separation of power. That is, certain ascriptions fit some classes but not others.21 
Thus, the necessary level of class specificity is at least partially determined by the fit 
between what the theory predicates and the thing it is predicated of. It is because 
                                                     
20 Ibid. 
21 Ryle, Concept of Mind, 6-8. 
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shared context and meaning are so important to making two theories equally 
conceptions of the good life that I begin my discussion of conception of the good life 
in Section 2.1 with the various meanings of “goodness” qua the good life. 
But meeting the two conditions of co-referentiality is still insufficient to prevent 
talking at cross purposes. For instance, two magazine executives could agree that 
fashionable means stylish when it comes to bags but one could be answering what 
the cover girl should carry and the other what their colleague bought in Paris. Back to 
conceptions of justice, two theories only genuinely disagree if they disagree about the 
conditions under which institutions avoid arbitrary distinctions and determine a proper 
balance in assigning basic social rights and duties. In general we could say that 
besides being co-referential, theories must also agree about what is at stake in the 
debate to be conceptions of the same concept.  
As such, before analysing conceptions, I must explain the central concern of 
a conception of the good life. A conception of the good life is a theory explaining what 
it means for a life to be good. Of course, some theories may be negative conceptions 
that explain the concept only in the sense of disassembling it. These include sceptical 
accounts which hold such knowledge to be unattainable.22 There may also be error 
theoretical accounts which hold that statements like “x is the good life” are 
systematically prone to error and hence cannot be true.  
If we consider only positive conceptions that hold some proposition of the 
form “x is the good life” to be true, we see that conceptions of the good life are at 
least action explanatory in the sense that whatever is in the place of x can be held up 
as a rationale for action. This does not entail however that the conception must be 
action guiding, because like particularists the theory might entail that knowledge of 
the good life is non-codifiable.23 That is, the conception may hold that knowledge of 
the good life could never be codified into finite truth apt propositions, rules of thumb 
or other heuristics for decision making, hence no theory could ever be reliably action 
                                                     
22  Christopher Woodard fittingly terms these no-answer theories. “Classifying 
Theories of Welfare”, 800. 




guiding.24 Nonetheless, as long as the conception is a positive one, one that believes 
that there is some x that conforms to the good life (or at least a good life), then the 
conception is explanatory in the sense that it is possible (although perhaps not 
humanly possible but merely metaphysically possible) to ask of some life whether it is 
like x and thus a good life. 
If the theory does hold that there is some goodness that could be predicated 
of our life as a whole, then one would be justified at placing that as one’s highest 
good or the final end which one’s life aims at. As Julia Annas puts it, the concept of 
our highest good or final end gives the agent a way to reflect “on her life as a whole 
and the way in which her values and projects do (or do not) fit together into an overall 
structure which gives her life coherence and direction. Such a structure is formed by 
one's projects being pursued for the sake of a further, ultimate goal, one's "final 
end".”25 It may help to put this in terms of choices. Living involves making decisions, 
from daily minutiae to watershed decisions concerning a second child, a job in 
Johannesburg, re-mortgaging the house etc. In this language of choices, asking 
whether we have lived well is to ask whether our decisions, at least the big ones, are 
taking our life in the right direction. Having a concept of the highest good is having 
such a concept of a right direction for our lives. These are the stakes of the debate to 
which we now turn. 
 
                                                     
24 For example, on Rosalind Hursthouse’s Neo-Aristotelian view, knowledge of what 
is truly worthwhile in life is non-codifiable. Hursthouse does believe though that one 
can live and act well through the acquisition of phronesis or practical wisdom, which 
also brings with it the mastery of said knowledge. See Hursthouse, “What does the 
Aristotelian phronimos know?” 
25 Annas, “The Good Life”, 134. 
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Since my goal is to find a way of life that reconciles subjective and objective 
conceptions of wellbeing, I need to outline clearly the concept of wellbeing and the 
differences between subjective and objective theories. Section 2.2 roughly divides 
conceptions of the good life into moral and wellbeing conceptions according to how 
“goodness” qua the good life is understood. I propose in Section 2.3 that subjectivism 
is a view wherein one’s feelings and/or evaluations towards x are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for x to constitute one’s wellbeing. Objectivism holds conversely 
that one’s feelings or evaluations towards x are insufficient for x to constitute one’s 
wellbeing, some additional element is needed. 
The debate ultimately reaches an impasse. Section 2.4 explains the 
subjectivist’s metaphysical and epistemological worries about objective value. While 
in Section 2.5, I show that objectivists have legitimate concerns about subjectivism’s 
ability to bar happy grass-counters and immoralists from having good lives. Since 
both sides appear to have legitimate concerns, neutrally speaking neither seems 
obviously better. 
 
2.2. Good in what sense? 
 
To be clear on what it means for a life to be good, we have to be clear about 
what kind of goodness is being discussed. The term “good” is used variously in 
everyday speech, including: 
(1) Expressing approval, as in ‘Good!’ or ‘Good job!’ 
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(2) Predicating the object to be an exemplary member of its class as in “that’s a 
good street bike” 
(3) Predicating the object to be beneficial for some purpose or for someone as in 
“that’s good for canker sores” or “she’s good for you”1 
(4) Predicating rightness or virtue of the act or person as in “you did a good thing” 
or “he’s a good man” 
 
If (1) is the sense of good in the proposition “x is the good life”, the phrase becomes a 
commendation of x, but this still leaves open why x is commendable. The 
straightforward answer is that x is commendable because x is good, but in what 
sense? If (2) is used instead, then the proposition implies that x is an exemplary life. 
This means that x fares well in terms of the elements characteristic of and/or 
important to a life.  
In short, the goodness of a life in terms of (2) implies that x contains some 
elements considered good in a life. For example, take health and relationships to be 
two plausible examples of characteristic and/or important elements the inclusion of 
which makes x the good life. This raises the question of what makes health and 
relationships characteristic and/or important such that their possession makes our life 
good. Their goodness could only be explained in terms of (3) or (4). Explaining them 
in terms of (2) or (1) would regress to the question of the sense in which these 
elements are exemplary or commendable respectively. If the goodness of the 
elements were instead explained in terms of (4), then they would be right-making or 
virtuous features. This means that x is exemplary in the sense of being morally 
excellent, which is the same as explaining goodness directly in terms of (4). Similarly, 
if the goodness of the elements were to be explained in terms of (3), then those 
elements would be beneficial for the purpose of one’s life or person. I will state this as 
x is prudentially excellent, which is equal to explaining goodness directly in terms of 
(3). Hence, it seems that the two principal ways that a life may be good is morally or 
prudential excellent.  
It is possible to argue that moral and prudential excellence ultimately 
converges. This would be the case if the goodness of one’s life in terms of personal 
                                                     
1 For the different accounts of “good for” and a defence of “good for” as beneficial for 
some purpose or someone see Zimmerman, “Understanding What’s Good for Us”.  
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benefit hinged ultimately on one’s virtue, or moral virtue is really somehow a matter of 
prudential excellence. Aristotle for example argued famously that what is good for us 
qua Homo sapiens is the sort of activity that is characteristically human, which would 
be an activity that exercises capacities that set us aside from other species. However, 
characteristically human activities can only be fully accomplished when accomplished 
virtuously, “then if this is so, the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in 
accordance with virtue, and if there are several virtues, in accordance with the best 
and most complete.”2 Thus, although we can initially understand the good life for us 
as that which is personally beneficial, our good is ultimately served by living virtuously. 
Assuming that Julia Annas’ interpretation is right, virtue here is meant in a moral 
sense.3 If so then, for Aristotle, a life is prudentially excellent if and only if it is morally 
excellent. 
However, we have competing theories of what makes an action, a person or 
a life morally good. Depending on the moral theory, the provisos of prudential 
excellence, and the circumstances under which we live, it may not be possible to live 
well personally and morally. To see this potential incompatibility, assume that Kantian 
ethics is the correct moral theory. Also imagine a cutthroat world where living well (or 
even just living) often requires acting on the maxim of never taking the happiness of 
others as an end-in-itself while continuing to anticipate and rely on others, not least 
one’s parents for example, taking one’s happiness as an end-in-itself. This maxim is 
contradictory when willed as a universal law. A world in which everyone never takes 
the happiness of others as ends-in-themselves is a world in which it is impossible to 
rely on such benevolence. Thus, it fails the test of the formula of universal law and is 
morally impermissible. The implication for our discussion of the good life is that we 
cannot assume that senses (3) and (4) of goodness will converge rather than diverge. 
Therefore, we should treat both as plausible senses of goodness for a conception of 
the good life. Furthermore, where sense (4) is intended, what moral theory is 
assumed or argued for needs to be clarified. 
                                                     
2 Crisp, Nicomachean Ethics, 12. 
3 Annas, Morality of Happiness, 120-131. 
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Similarly where sense (3) is intended, the theory of that which is good for our 
whole life or person, conventionally known as our wellbeing, needs to be specified. 
This is the traditional classification according to Shelly Kagan.  
Mental state theory (MST): wellbeing consists in a certain mental states. For 
example, pleasure in the case of hedonism. 
 
Desire-satisfaction theory (DST): wellbeing consists in the attainment of 
desired states of affairs regardless of whether pleasure accompanies said 
attainment 
 
Objective list theory (OLT): wellbeing consists in the attainment of L, where L 
is a list of things that are good whether the individual desires them or finds 
pleasure in their attainment.4  
 
According to Kagan, the traditional classification mistakenly categorizes MST as 
falling outside the DST and OLT divide. The more revealing division concerns the 
source of the value of wellbeing. He proposes instead that “there are subjective 
theories (most saliently, desire theories) and there are objective theories.”5 We shall 
see in the next section why Kagan might think that DST is the most salient subjective 
theory, but DST is important enough to occupy much of the next chapter. Crucially, 
Kagan does not explain what makes a theory subjective or objective, so this is the 
goal of the next section.  
 
2.3. Subjectively and Objectively Good Lives 
 
What would it mean for a life to be subjectively or objectively good for us? For 
L.W. Sumner, wellbeing is subjective if “being well off will depend (in some way or 
other) on having a favourable attitude towards one’s life (or some of its ingredients), 
while being badly off will require being unfavourably disposed towards it.” Wellbeing 
                                                     
4  Kagan, “Limits of Wellbeing”, 169-170. This classification goes back to Parfit, 
Reasons and Persons, 493. On this classification, perfectionism, wherein wellbeing 
consists in the development of certain human capacities regardless of whether we 
desire or find pleasure in them, would be a subspecies of OLT. 
5  Kagan, “Limits of Wellbeing”, 187-188. He also argues that the traditional 
classification fails to capture the difference between theories that restrict one’s 
wellbeing to facts within one’s person and those allowing facts outside one’s person 
to factor. While this distinction is important in its own right, it is the subjective-
objective distinction that I am interested in exploring. 
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is objective if “something can be (directly and immediately) good for me though I do 
not regard it favourably, and my life can be going well despite my failing to have any 
positive attitude towards it.”6 You might notice however that if we stated Sumnerian 
subjectivism as ‘wellbeing consists in the attainment of a favourable attitude towards 
one’s life’ then it begins to seem objective. It is after all conceivable that S does not 
desire or find pleasure in the attainment of a favourable attitude towards one’s life. 
Perhaps S thinks that accomplishments are all that matter and having a favourable 
attitude towards one’s life leads to complacency. Sumner, like every wellbeing 
theorist, is making a truth claim about wellbeing, namely ‘wellbeing consists in x’. The 
truth claim itself is in this sense ubiquitously objective, the debate concerns whether x 
is objective or subjective. 7 
x—that which wellbeing consists in—could be objective or subjective in two 
ways. Enumerative or “which things make someone’s life go better for them” theories 
would be concerned with whether the set of goods x itself is subjective or objective 
(provided a set of goods could be subjective or objective).8 Explanatory or “what is it 
about these things that make them good for people” theories would be concerned 
with whether the source of x’s value is subjective or objective.9 I agree with Kagan 
that the latter is the more important question, but the meaning of explanatory 
subjectivity or objectivity remains unclear. 
I will follow Thomas Nagel in considering the divide between subjective and 
objective theories as a difference in perspective with regards to understanding 
something. Accordingly, the most subjective viewpoint with regards to the goodness 
of x is my view of why x constitutes wellbeing. 10 In other words, my feelings or 
evaluations towards x are necessary and sufficient conditions for x to constitute my 
wellbeing. For example, heroin is subjectively good for Harry merely because he 
                                                     
6 Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, 38. 
7 It is possible to put forward one’s individual perspective that ‘wellbeing consists in x’ 
and intend that to be a purely subjective claim. But this paper concerns debates 
between competing theories of wellbeing. 
8  For a taxonomy of enumerative views see Woodard, “Classifying Theories of 
Welfare”. 
9 This distinction originates from Crisp, Reasons and the Good, 102–103. 
10 Nagel, View from Nowhere, 4-5. 
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enjoys it, regardless of its negative effects. If we extend this to Harry’s life as a whole, 
it means that living as he does is good merely because he feels or judges it so. In 
other words, he feels or judges himself to be happy.11 
According to our definition, there are three possible types of happiness 
theories or three ways that we could spell out what it means to feel or judge ourselves 
to be happy. Following Bengt Brülde, we shall label these cognitive, affective, and 
hybrid. On a cognitive view, to be happy is to positively evaluate one’s life, for 
instance, to have a Sumnerian favourable attitude towards it. On an affective view, 
happiness is some pleasurable feeling and/or positive mood. A hybrid view combines 
cognitive and affective elements.12  
Brülde’s list gives us a more concrete understanding of what it means to feel 
or judge ourselves to be happy but it also raises questions about the subjectivity of 
psychological states. Like Kagan, for Sumner a theory’s subjectivity does not depend 
on whether the enumerated sources of welfare are subjective “but the role it assigns 
to the subject’s concerns in identifying those sources”. Hence, just because an OLT 
lists pleasure (understood as a homogenous sensation) instead of knowledge or 
virtue does not make it less objective.13 Matt Ferkany objects that this assumes that 
only what he calls voluntarist theories, where “final authority concerning what 
constitutes a person’s wellbeing rests with that person in that something can 
constitute it only if she would agree (or would agree in appropriate circumstances) 
that it does or affirm, desire, or value it on reflection”, are legitimate subjective 
theories. According to Ferkany, psychologist theories, where “wellbeing is constituted 
solely by psychological states of experiencing subjects, such as perceptual states, 
feelings, or attitudes”, are equally subjective “inasmuch as they identify wellbeing with 
                                                     
11  Given that happiness has such subjective connotations I shall avoid using 
happiness as a synonym for the good life. I shall reserve the term for subjective 
theories of wellbeing. 
12 Brülde, “Happiness Theories of the Good Life”, 17-20 
13 Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, 93. 
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psychological states of experiencing subjects”. For Ferkany, subjectivism is true if 
either voluntarism or psychologism is true.14 
I side with Sumner on the doubtful subjectivity of psychologism. I suspect that 
the intuitive desirability of pleasurable feelings and positive moods is blocking our 
perception of this. Consider anti-hedonism, the thesis that wellbeing consists in the 
experience of visceral pain. Since pain is a perceptual state and/or feeling, anti-
hedonism qualifies as psychologism. Since anti-hedonism identifies wellbeing with 
the psychological state of the experiencing subject it also meets Ferkany’s definition 
of subjectivism. Surely most people would find anti-hedonism false. The problem is 
that most of us would not endorse pain as good for us, and anti-hedonism like other 
species of psychologism gives no role to the subject’s concerns in identifying sources 
of wellbeing. If this is right then Sumner is right that only voluntarism is truly 
subjective. On this view, positive feelings are implicit endorsements of state of affairs. 
After all, we do not consciously evaluate all states of affairs. Sometimes we sub-
consciously allow or disallow some to continue because they cause positive or 
negative feelings. In light of this, and in lieu of the clumsy voluntarist formula, I will 
define subjectivism as a view wherein one’s feelings or evaluations towards x are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for x to constitute one’s wellbeing. 15 In this sense, 
a subjectively good life is one in which one feels or judges oneself to be happy. Since 
doing what makes one feel or judge oneself to be happy is practically synonymous 
with doing what one desires, we can see why Kagan considered DST the most salient 
subjective theory. But we shall see in the next chapter that the connection between 
DST, subjectivism and our happiness is not so straightforward. 
2.4. The problem with objectivism according to subjectivists 
 
                                                     
14 Ferkany, “Objectivity of Wellbeing”, 474-476. 
15 Woodard suggested then rejected this division between subjective and objective 
explanatory theories in favour of a subjective, objective, naturalist triumvirate. A 
naturalist theory is one that cites natural facts such as biological function. The validity 
of naturalism in wellbeing is an interesting question, but it is also tangential to our 
core agenda. Woodard, “Classifying Theories of Welfare”, 797-800. 
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The quintessential subjectivist complaint against objectivism is the alienation 
objection, also known as the endorsement constraint on wellbeing. Peter Railton 
phrases it as such: 
Is it true that all normative judgments must find an internal resonance in 
those to whom they are applied? While I do not find this thesis convincing as 
a claim about all species of normative assessment, it does seem to me to 
capture an important feature of the concept of intrinsic value to say that what 
is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a connection with what he 
would find in some degree compelling or attractive, at least if he were rational 
and aware. It would be an intolerably alienated conception of someone’s 
good to imagine that it might fail in any such way to engage him. 16 
 
In other words, how could something be good for me if I do not agree that it is or 
affirm, desire, or value it on reflection? Recall that x is subjectively good only if the 
goodness of x is determined by the agent’s positive evaluation of or feeling about x. If 
subjective and objective exhaust the conceptual space, then x is objectively good if 
the goodness of x is not determined by the agent’s positive evaluation of or feeling 
about x, which sounds suspiciously like the objection raised. As Ben Bradley notes, 
the endorsement constraint effectively dismisses objectivism simply because it is not 
subjectivism.17 
Perhaps you find this offhand dismissal of the endorsement constraint as 
question begging unsatisfactory as well. If so, let us attempt to tease out what lies 
behind the objection’s intuitive appeal. I will start with where the subjectivist and 
objectivist would meet. For some OLT where wellbeing consists in x, if one also 
happens to endorse x or x is the sort of thing that everyone endorses, then the 
problem does not arise. The problem arises when I do not endorse x. There are two 
main paths for the objectivist now. He could plead that I really should care. That is, I 
would care if I were rational or fully informed about x. In the next section, we shall see 
that if the subjectivist accepted this he would have to surrender his position. The high 
road would be to suggest that x just is good regardless of what anyone thinks. Before 
we press on, notice that the negative definition of objectivism (as basically non-
subjectivism) leaves open the key question for an explanatory theory—‘what is it 
                                                     
16 Railton, “Facts and Values”, 9. 
17 Bradley, “Objective Theories of Well-Being”, 233. 
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about these things that make them good for people’. An analysis of objectivity will 
give us a better understanding of the theoretical resources required to support claims 
of objective goodness. 
Again I follow Nagel in considering the divide between subjective and 
objective theories as a difference in perspective with regards to understanding 
something. Accordingly, the most subjective viewpoint with regards to the goodness 
of x is my view of why x is good. 18 Let us call this the subjective viewpoint. To move 
towards the objective end of the spectrum would be to broaden the perspective taken, 
such as how my society understands why x is good. This perspective can be filled out 
actually or hypothetically. The actual view could be the aggregation or the 
commonalities among the individual members of my society. This may be called a 
collective-subjective view as it is essentially a collection of individual perspectives. An 
alternative would select only the views of a privileged few, connoisseurs of the good 
life if you will.19 This would be an elitist but still subjective view as the substantive 
contents are still composed of the feelings and attitudes of individuals. Thus, we can 
move further towards objectivism by moving away from actual individual perspectives. 
The hypothetical perspective would be some, perhaps historically or 
anthropologically charted, theory about why typical members of my society, or my 
society as an anthropomorphized entity, deems x to be good. For example, Jim 
Cullen in the American Dream describes a quintessentially American perspective of 
the good life that is present from the puritan settlers, the Declaration of Independence, 
the Civil Rights Movement through to the present. It is a dream of freedom to lead a 
richer life. Cullen argues that such richness is now typically understood in terms of 
wealth, but it could equally like it has in the past take on a spiritual or civic dimension. 
These ideals are bound by a dream of freedom from religious, political, social and/or 
economic bondage that typically comes from being in a subordinate social class, as 
puritans were in the 1600s relative to Anglicans, and African-Americans were in 
                                                     
18 Nagel, View from Nowhere, 4-5. 
19 This may be the good life in capitalist societies if glossy high society magazines are 
to be believed. 
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1950s-60s relative to Caucasian-Americans. This is why the American Dream is 
typically couched in terms of upward socio-economic mobility.20 Cullen here adopts 
an abstract perspective derived from the historical perspective of Americans but 
independent and devoid of the particularities of any individual American. If we 
telescope our view out further, we could adopt yet more abstract perspectives, such 
as the omniscient perspective of God or the purely theoretical standpoint of a 
normative ethical theory. Nagel calls this “a view from nowhere”. 21 But at this level of 
abstraction, it might as well be called a view of nobody, because the goodness of x is 
not predicated upon anyone actually feeling or believing so. 
According to Sumner, a view of nobody leaves out an essential feature of 
wellbeing, which is that wellbeing concerns how well life is going for you. 
This subject-relativity is an essential feature of our ordinary concept of 
welfare. It does not merely rest on the truism that all welfare is someone’s 
welfare, the welfare of some particular individual. If lives are the sort of things 
that can have perfectionist value then personal excellence is always the 
excellence of some particular person, but the category of perfectionist value 
is free of the relativizing indexicals which are characteristic to well-being. 
Among the modes of value which can belong to individual lives, welfare 
stands out by virtue of incorporating an internal reference to its bearer.22 
 
Sumner seems to be onto something but the concept of a necessary internal 
reference to its bearer is nebulous. Like Sumner, I think that there is more to this then 
simply asserting that wellbeing refers to that which is good for some agent. But if the 
assertion is that your welfare must be predicated upon your circumstances, feelings 
and/or judgements then it comes too close to begging the question against his 
opponents. 
Rather than assuming that your welfare must be predicated upon or make 
reference to your motivational factors, let us consider the contrary scenario. If the 
goodness of x is based on your individual perspective, such goodness need not 
constitute a reason for anyone else to pursue x, but it would axiomatically constitute a 
reason for you. Derek Parfit calls these agent relative reasons.23 On the other hand, 
                                                     
20 Cullen, American Dream. 
21 Nagel, View from Nowhere, 5. 
22 Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, 42. 
23 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 41. 
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the goodness of x described from a purely theoretical standpoint does not constitute 
automatic reasons for anyone to do anything with respect to x. 24  Since such 
goodness is neither predicated upon nor directly related to your motivational factors, 
a more complicated story is needed to explain how such goodness comes to 
constitute reasons for you. That is, this raises questions about the normativity of the 
life prescribed, or more specifically, the generality of reasons for living according to 
the theory. Since the theory does not favour any particular perspective, we all stand 
in the same relation to such goodness. Hence, insofar as said theory attributes aims 
at all to agents, it attributes common aims to all agents. Parfit calls this an agent-
neutral theory.25 Such a theory needs to prove that this aim is something intrinsically 
valuable and hence should be (and not merely happens to be) a common aim for all. I 
will return to this shortly but it is a tall order to say the least. 
Besides the agent-relative versus agent-neutral divide, Nagel identifies two 
other senses of generality.26 A generality of breadth concerns the extent to which the 
substantive content of the prescription governs one’s conduct in all areas of life. A 
less general prescription in this sense has little force outside of its restricted 
domain.27 For instance, a rule against lying is not instructive when it comes to choices 
between a liberal arts college and the Ivy League, or between killing one person and 
letting ten die. Since a conception of the good life is axiomatically concerned with 
what is good for our life as a whole, its prescriptions would hence have to be broadly 
applicable to all areas of our life.  
One might object that there are ostensibly narrower conceptions, such as the 
aforementioned Aristotelian conception of eudemonia in which the good life is activity 
of the soul in accordance with reason and moral virtue. Presumably, this view would 
                                                     
24  Possible exceptions include agents with an existing interest in the theory and 
agents that are the subject of some theory about their priorities and values in 
particular. 
25 Ibid. 
26 I chose Parfit’s agent-neutral and agent-relative distinction over Nagel’s because 
suitably for our purposes Parfit applies the distinction to theories first and then to 
persons. Anyway, Parfit’s distinction and Nagel’s are extensionally equivalent. See 
Ridge, "Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative". 
27 Nagel, View from Nowhere, 152. 
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be silent on decisions only distantly related to reason and morality, such as matters of 
personal preferences. Assuming that one does not dress immodestly, we might take 
the theory as indifferent about our dressing. Either this is because the theory has 
considered the matter and brushed it aside, or it was neglected. The former is still 
instructive since it tells us that this is a matter of non-importance. In other words, it is 
not contributory to or constitutive of our final ends. If the latter is true instead, then the 
question is whether the theory ought to have considered it. That is, whether the 
matter is arguably contributory to or constitutive of our final ends. If it indeed actually 
is, then the conception is or could be made instructive in this area as well. If the 
conception could not be made applicable, then the theory is incomplete. Therefore, 
any positive conception of the good life is (with the caveats about action guidance laid 
out in Section 1.3) broadly general or instructive in all areas of our life. 
This broad generality becomes a problem when our various priorities collide. 
For example, following Bryan Van Norden’s interpretation of the Analects 
for Ruists (and here I will hazard generalizing over the more than two 
millennia history of the movement) the good life involves participation in 
communal ritual activities, aesthetic appreciation, intellectual activities (but 
always with an ultimately practical aim), caring for and benefiting others (with 
greater concern for and obligations to those bound to one by special relations 
such as kinship and friendship), the joy that comes from virtuous activity 
(even in the face of adversity), but also appropriate sadness at loss.28 
 
Here Van Norden presents the constitutive ends of a Confucian conception of the 
good life. When accompanied by a fuller description of what these ends involve, such 
as the meaning and forms of Confucian ritual, one would arguably have a practical 
guide to life.29 Except that the text is unclear on how to juggle a Confucian’s many 
priorities. 30  What should one do when obligation to one’s kin conflicts with 
participation in an important communal ritual activity?  
Subjectivism sidesteps this issue because the agent is free to prioritize as 
she wishes. Any conflicts are thus blamed on conflicts in the agent’s preferences or 
beliefs. Of course, a single item OLT also avoids this problem. But even classical 
                                                     
28 Van Norden, Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism, 116-117. 
29 For more details about the conception, see Ibid., 99-126. 
30 Van Norden admits that it is unclear whether all the above listed are constitutive 
ends, some may be merely instrumental. Ibid., 116. 
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hedonism has strictly speaking two constitutive ends—the pursuit of pleasure and the 
avoidance of pain. It is therefore safe to say that most OLTs need an ordinal ranking, 
decision procedure or some capacity to order its various ends. Alvin Goldman sums 
up the subjectivist’s attitude to this endeavour as follows:  
There seems to be no sense attached to the notion of precise amounts of 
real or objective values of such objects, no notion of how much people should 
value objects, apart from how much they do value them or are willing to pay 
or exchange for them. If some persons ought to value some objects more or 
less than they do, this seems to be because those objects would satisfy or 
frustrate their concerns more than they currently believe.31  
 
That is, there seems to be no non-arbitrary way to universally order our priorities. 
Even if the OLT were to fall back on some decision procedure or capacity, what could 
justify the rightness of this capacity other than its tendency to correctly prioritize? This 
brings us back to what justifies some ordering as universally right. 
The third way that reasons can be more or less general “is in their degree of 
externality, or independence of the concerns of sentient beings.” On this scale, the 
most general reason to x would be if the goodness of x “is not merely a function of the 
satisfaction that people may derive from them or of the fact that anyone wants them—
a value which is not reducible to their value for anyone.” 32 This is to say that a 
universe entirely comprised of x quite alone, without any accompaniments or effects 
whatsoever, is better than a universe with nothing at all; or to say that x has intrinsic 
value as G.E. Moore had defined it. 33 If x has intrinsic value in this sense, x would still 
have value from a perspective sub specie aeterninatis—a perspective that takes in all 
of time and space.  
One worries though that, as Simon Blackburn put it, if we adopt a perspective 
that “has the whole of time and space in its gaze”, then “our life shrinks to 
nothingness, just an insignificant, infinitesimal fragment of the whole”.34 Nothing in our 
                                                     
31 Goldman, “The Case Against Objective Values”, 512. 
32 Nagel, View from Nowhere, 153. 
33 Moore, Ethics, 28. 
34 Blackburn, Being Good, 79. Blackburn goes on to express further concern. “When 
we ask if life has meaning, the first question has to be, to whom? To a witness with 
the whole of space and time in its view, nothing on a human scale will have meaning 
(it is hard to imagine how it could be visible at all—there is an awful lot of space and 
time out there)” Ibid. 
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lives seems to have enduring value from a perspective sub specie aeterninatis. The 
second worry is that, even if anything plausibly had intrinsic value, how do we prove it? 
As Thomas Carson has argued, defenders of intrinsic value who argue that it can be 
directly perceived have not adequately explained the difference between veridical and 
non-veridical perception. Alternatively, defenders who argue that intrinsic value 
figures into the best explanations for human behaviour and psychology presuppose 
that we have a sufficiently comprehensive account of human behaviour and 
psychology that we could determine what makes for an adequate theory.35  
The alternative would be to abandon the sub specie aeterninatis viewpoint. 
But if we are interested in an objective conception of wellbeing, then we cannot 
retreat to one’s particular point-of-view. We need x to be good for us regardless of our 
feelings and/or beliefs about x. Blackburn’s own solution is to retreat to shared 
dispositions, such as concern for people around us.36 One might even call these 
characteristically human concerns. Since they are characteristically human, then if 
one meets the theory’s criteria of humanity one should have these concerns as well. 
According to Blackburn, the very possibility of common viewpoints is due to discourse 
and hence at bottom reason is the common human viewpoint. 37  This becomes 
extensionally equivalent to introducing a rationality constraint (albeit an idiosyncratic 
one) on subjectivism. I will revisit this when discussing the subjectivist’s possible 
responses to the objectivist in the next section. 
In this section, we have discovered some justificatory problems with the 
objectivist answer to ‘what is it about these things that make them good for people’. 
Christopher Woodard notes that “a large part of the interest in explanatory 
subjectivism has to do with worries about the ontological and epistemological 
commitments of objective theories of value”. Hence, hybrid theories wherein the 
                                                     
35 Carson, Value and the Good Life, 181-213. In Chapters 1-5, Carson argues that 
prominent philosophers of the good life, including Aristotle, Mill and Nietzsche, 
presuppose the existence of impersonal value. 
36 Blackburn, Being Good, 129-133. Of course, the extent to which concern for people 




subject’s attitudes and feelings are necessary but not sufficient belong alongside 
objectivism as allowing for objective values.38 Bradley sums it up neatly. 
A likely motivation for being a subjectivist about well-being is a commitment to a 
naturalistic metaphysical worldview that does not allow for an irreducible, non-
natural property of goodness for an individual (this may be in part because of 
epistemological worries about such properties). If you are suspicious of such 
properties, but you believe that some things are good for you and some things 
are bad for you, it is natural to think that all this amounts to is that you want or like 
some things and don’t want or like others. Certain things seem to have the glow 
of goodness about them, but this just means we want them; other things seem to 
have the stench of badness emanating from them, but this just means we are 
averse to them.39 
 
2.5. The problem with subjectivism according to objectivists 
 
Since according to subjectivism, one’s feelings or evaluations regarding x are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for x to constitute the good life, all sorts of 
diametrically opposed lives could be considered good so long as their owners feel 
positively about them or evaluate them positively. A sadistic serial killer and a 
compassionate social worker could both approve of the lives they lead, and so both 
would lead good lives according to a cognitive theory of happiness which holds 
positive evaluation of one’s life to be the sole condition for wellbeing. Similarly, a 
penniless illiterate sickly orphan and a pampered athletic aristocrat-to-be could, 
despite or due to their circumstances, feel happy and thereby lead good lives 
according to an affective view. This is true even if our judgements and feelings 
conflict. For instance, if at some time Harry felt happy about heroin use and at 
another time, or even at the same time, Harry felt happy about abstinence. Theories 
of happiness need not commit to any specific actions or things being consistently 
good across time and circumstance even for the same person. 
Assume that by definition a conception of the good life should explain what it 
means to lead the good life. If we put a theory of happiness in this position, say an 
affective theory, it merely tells us to seek what makes us feel happy. It does not give 
                                                     
38 Woodard, “Classifying Theories of Welfare”, 798. 
39 Bradley, “Objective Theories of Well-Being”, 12. 
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us a determinate decision procedure, but rather puts the onus back on us. By 
definition it cannot add anything more to what we already judge or feel to be positive 
or negative, and hence cannot assess the validity of that judgement. If Oliver enjoyed 
the company and practice of brigands in his youth as well as the company and 
intellectual life of gentlemen in adulthood, he might suspect that both cannot be good, 
at least not in the same way. Like Oliver, sometimes we want to know whether 
something is good for us despite how we feel about it. It is a thought like this that 
motivates objective conceptions of the good life. 
We can now see the objectivist’s principal objection to subjectivism. 
Subjectivism entails that we cannot be wrong about what we feel or judge to be truly 
good, so long as we are not mistaken about our dispositions or the intended state of 
affairs. This exception is actually quite tricky though as the import for subjectivism of 
mistakes in our judgement of what would make us happy is not so clear. I shall deal 
with these cases in the next chapter. But if we are not at all mistaken, that is, if the 
achieved state of affairs is indeed endorsed then it does not matter the tiniest bit if 
like Harry, the endorsed state of affairs is self-destructive, or like the serial killer we 
take sadistic pleasure in our actions, or if all that we ever wanted was to get an 
accurate count of the grass in one’s lawn.40 
It is possible to amend a theory of happiness to enable more general 
prescriptions. It could appeal to empirical facts about the activity, such as heroin’s 
detrimental effects on one’s physiological and psychological health, along with 
Harry’s other ends. But this advice is suggestive rather than imperative. It merely 
amounts to heroin being detrimental to Harry’s long term happiness, of which the 
theories offer no reason to favour over his current happiness. In fact, he has reason 
to be suspicious of delaying gratification for fear of his plans being scuppered by 
                                                     
40 “Thus imagine someone whose only pleasure is to count blades of grass in various 
geometrically shaped areas such as park squares and well-trimmed lawns. He is 
otherwise intelligent and actually possesses unusual skills, since he manages to 
survive by solving difficult mathematical problems for a fee. The definition of the good 
forces us to admit that the good for this man is indeed counting blades of grass, or 
more accurately, his good is determined by a plan that gives an especially prominent 
place to this activity.” Rawls, Theory of Justice, 379. 
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unkind fate. Alternatively, the theory could appeal to empirical facts about humans, 
such as the ends we typically have or the circumstances typically conducive of 
positive evaluation or affect. Again the theories offer no reason to favour behaviour 
that typically makes people happy over behaviour that actually makes him happy.  
If all else fails, one could add the constraint that heroin is only good for Harry 
if a rational and relevantly informed (or for a stronger constraint—ideally informed) 
version of Harry would still endorse it. Now Harry’s preferences and judgments are 
being assessed from some theory of rationality while the relevant features of his 
situation are being determined by some idealized standpoint. Both standpoints are 
independent of his current evaluation. This is problematic partially because this 
idealized standpoint is indeterminate. 41  Given that Harry’s life currently revolves 
around his habit, an idealized, rational, well informed and presumably drug free 
version of Harry could well have drastically different dispositions and endorsements. 
It would not be a stretch to call “ideal Harry” a different man altogether. Since 
idealized Harry’s character and preferences would be very different, the goodness of 
the states of affairs that idealized Harry endorses has nothing to do with Harry’s 
actual feeling or judgement. The goodness of these states of affairs relies instead on 
the same theoretical justification that makes the idealized standpoint a good 
perspective. Thus, it is problematic for the subjectivist most of all because adding this 
constraint means that the goodness of something is now grounded in this theoretical 
perspective and not one’s subjective viewpoint. 
The subjectivist has difficulty justifying the rational and relevantly informed or 
other similar constraints on our preferences. It cannot be that these qualities are 
                                                     
41 The criticism that an ideal observer’s standard of goodness is indeterminate has 
been made by more than a few commentators. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord encapsulates 
it succinctly in his criticism of Hume, whom he takes to have an ideal observer theory. 
“Although stable, and presumably univocal in its deliverances, that point of view is not 
sufficiently accessible. We have neither the psychological equipment nor the 
knowledge required. Our estimates of the Ideal Observer's view of the effects of 
someone's character will differ in exactly the way our judgments of actual effects will 
differ. As a result, an Ideal Observer sets an inappropriate standard, not simply 
because we cannot take up her position ourselves (though we cannot), but because 
we cannot begin to anticipate what her reactions might be.” “Why Hume's 'General 
Point of View' Isn't Ideal”, 218. 
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inherently good, which a simple minded hedonist like Harry might understandably 
disagree with, because this would also mean abandoning the subjective viewpoint. 
Instead, Sumner suggests that the underlying reason for subjectivism’s attractiveness 
is that given the uniqueness and opaqueness of our dispositions and personal 
circumstances we are the best judge of what is good for us. However, the validity of 
our judgement is premised upon their veracity and autonomy. When we are 
misinformed or brainwashed, the judgements are no longer representative of our 
priorities and values and so lose their authority.42 This is not true though, as Ferkany 
has pointed out, in cases of self-deception or wilful ignorance. Ferkany gives the 
example of a wife who refuses to acknowledge and move on from her husband’s 
affair.43 Although the example is apt, it could also be interpreted as a reflection of the 
wife’s prioritization of companionship over fidelity. The point seems to be stronger 
than that. Even the most deluded preference will reflect some priority as long as it is 
wilful. In a sense, Harry’s persistent denial of his addiction reflects the value that he 
places on pleasure from the high (and/or the avoidance of suffering from withdrawal). 
While that value may seem excessive even to a subjectivist like Sumner, given the 
subjectivist’s insistence on the opacity of our lives and the privileged position of our 
feelings and evaluations, who are we to judge?  
There are also cases where people are ostensibly rational and relevantly 
informed and yet we may not want their lives to be considered good. Consider the 
following picture from Cahn’s The Happy Immoralist: 
Consider Fred, a fictitious person, but an amalgamation of several people I 
have known. Fred’s life has been devoted to achieving three aims: fame, 
wealth, and a reputation for probity. He has no interest whatever in friends or 
truth. Indeed, he is treacherous and thoroughly dishonest. Nevertheless, he 
has attained his three goals and is, in fact, a rich celebrity renowned for his 
supposed integrity. His acquiring a good name while acting unscrupulously is 
a tribute to his audacity, cunning, and luck. Now he rests self-satisfied, 
basking in renown, delighting in luxuries, and relishing praise for his reputed 
commitment to the highest moral standards.44  
                                                     
42 Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, 152-172. 
43 Ferkany, “Objectivity of Wellbeing”, 483-484. 
44 Cahn, “Happy Immoralist”. See also Cahn, “Happy Immoralist: A Sequel”. Consider 
also Shridhar Chillal, who painstakingly (to the extent of permanent nerve damage 
and forgoing all normal activities) and spectacularly achieved the longest fingernails 




In their reply, Matthew Cashen and Larry May criticize Cahn for making impossible 
the distinction between feeling and being happy. On Cahn’s account, Fred “must be 
happy because he so clearly feels happy”.45 This neatly demonstrates that if feeling 
or judging oneself to be happy is all it takes to have a good life then there are no 
grounds for excluding cases like Fred. But if the subjectivist adds further conditions 
and develops a stricter theory of wellbeing, then feeling or judging oneself to be 
happy would no longer be a sufficient condition. Thus, the subjectivist has difficulty 
holding onto the subjective viewpoint while excluding happy irrationalists, trivialists 
and immoralists. 
 
2.6. An impasse 
 
If I am right thus far then we have reached a sort of stalemate. The 
subjectivist is not dismissing objectivism simply as non-subjectivism. The subjectivist 
is motivated by metaphysical and epistemological concerns about the existence of an 
irreducible, non-natural property of goodness for an individual.46 Such intrinsic value 
could be taken as the target of John Mackie’s argument from queerness. Something 
so good that a universe entirely comprised of it alone is better than a universe with 
nothing at all has “qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from 
anything else in the universe.” Since this property is so different from other natural 
properties, Mackie thinks we would need “some special faculty of moral perception or 
intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else” to 
                                                                                                                                           
“The desire-fulfillment theory, however we tinker with it, would have to recognize 
Shridhar Chillal’s life as a great one…Undeniably, there’s some importance in getting 
what we want…But it does seem like there’s more that ought to be considered when 
we take stock of whether someone has led a good life or not.” The Weight of Things, 
59-60. 
45 Cashen and May, “The Happy Immoralist: Reply to Cahn”. 
46 Goldman is one such sceptic. He asserts quite plainly that no one actually acts as if 
objective value exists. “I shall conclude this section not by pursuing further the 
question whether we do typically pursue objective value – it seems so obvious that 
we do not”. “The Case Against Objective Values”, 511. 
35 
 
perceive it. 47  Given the queerness of this property, the subjectivist finds the 
objectivist’s claim to know what life is good for us even despite our judgments and 
feelings to the contrary very disconcerting. In contrast, our privileged access to our 
dispositions and personal circumstances, which makes us typically the best judge of 
what is good for us, lends the subjectivist position some intuitive appeal.  
The objectivist replies that if subjectivism is right then (barring mistakes about 
what would make us feel happy to be discussed in the next chapter) we can never be 
mistaken about what is good for us. But just as children often mistake their best 
interests, when we are in a poor frame of mind or lack relevant information we can 
mistake what is good for us. It is possible that certain things are just bad or good for 
us despite widespread opinion to the contrary. For example, less than a quarter of 
Chinese smokers surveyed in 1996 actually believed that smoking causes serious 
health problems. 48  The subjectivist could reply that adducing evidence of 
misinformation vis-à-vis some standard of wellbeing stacks the case against them. 
The subjectivist’s position just is that wellbeing consists in what we judge or feel to be 
good, rather than the prescriptions of some agent independent standard. He cannot 
add a rationality and relevant information constraint easily without abandoning the 
sufficiency of feeling or judging ourselves to be happy. Else he has to bite the bullet. 
If these Chinese smokers are aware of but continue to wilfully discount compelling 
evidence about the long term detrimental effects of smoking, as with educated and 
affluent smokers in developed countries, then their smoking truly reflects their 
prioritization of immediate term gratification and who is to fault them for it. However, 
the subjectivist must now admit that happy irrationalists, trivialists and immoralists 
can have just as good or even better lives than the wise and righteous.49  
Thus, both camps have their motivations and quandaries. A third party may 
find neither more compelling. The debate is gridlocked. Rapprochement requires 
                                                     
47 Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, 38. 
48 Yang et al., “Smoking cessation in China”, 170–174. 
49 I agree with Cahn that it is not the case that immoralists like Fred cannot be happy, 
“I would say, rather, that we are not happy with him. We do not wish to see 
shallowness and hypocrisy rewarded.” Cahn, “Happy Immoralist”, 1. 
36 
 
some concessions on each side. The subjectivist is concerned with the basis for 
ascription of objective value, so the crux here is maintaining the endorsement 
constraint. But if feeling or judging ourselves to be happy are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the good life, then other conditions, such as virtue or rationality, cannot 
simultaneously be necessary conditions. Instead, to placate the objectivist, we need 
to find a way of life that alleviates the objectivist’s happy immoralist concerns. One 
way to do this is to find a way of life that helps us prevent suffering, and hence help 
us feel or judge ourselves to be happy, and is also plausibly non-trivial and non-
immoral. This is what Chan offers. In the next chapter I will apply the analysis in this 









Recall the state of the debate. According to subjectivists, the endorsement 
constraint is the sole condition of wellbeing, that is, feeling or judging ourselves to be 
happy (subjective wellbeing) is a necessary and sufficient condition for wellbeing. The 
objectivist thinks the subjectivist is wrong that endorsement is sufficient. She does not 
grant that the immoralist has a good life even if he is a happy immoralist. If I am to 
reconcile the two positions, I need a view that remains grounded in the endorsement 
constraint, that is, an admissible subjectivist account. Thus Section 3.2 analyses the 
conditions under which the leading subjective view, Desire-satisfaction Theory (DST), 
is subjective or objective. I introduce Dead Sea apple cases (DSAs) where we attain 
our desire only to be disappointed to put DST in a dilemma. The first horn of the 
dilemma has DST avoiding the problem that DSAs pose by baldly asserting that 
desire-satisfaction is constitutive of wellbeing, regardless of whether it is 
accompanied by any positive psychological states. Defending this position introduces 
metaphysical commitments, which a subjectivist may find just as worrying as their 
metaphysical concerns regarding objectivism. 
Since there are many extant objections against DST’s brute assertion that 
desire-satisfaction constitutes wellbeing, I will consider instead two ways to justify the 
privileged position of desire-satisfaction in our wellbeing. Section 3.3 considers and 
refutes a metaphysical and/or causal relation between your desires and what 
essentially makes you you which imbues your desires with the property of constituting 
or tracking your level of wellbeing. Drawing from the Buddhist doctrine of non-self 
(anātman) I argue that the cognitive and conative processes that underlie desire 
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formation do not constitute a self, so our desires do not stand in any special relation 
to the self. 
If we reject a necessary connection between your desires and your wellbeing, 
either through constitution or metaphysical connection, then a subjectivist could only 
fall back on a contingent connection to justify the privileged position of desire-
satisfaction in our wellbeing. That is, to posit a reliable connection between desire-
satisfaction and subjective wellbeing. Let us call this view Subjective Desire 
Satisfactionism (SDS). SDS avoids the first horn of the DSA dilemma only to run into 
the second. Section 3.4 draws on the first noble truth of Buddhism—the truth of 
suffering—to develop the DSA case, that is, to argue that desire-satisfaction could be 
causally connected to suffering. This is the problem for SDS which I will use the Chan 
way of life to solve in the next chapter. 
 
3.2. Why subjectivists may not like Desire-satisfaction Theory 
 
I will start by introducing Dead Sea apples (DSAs), “cases in which someone 
desires something and then gets it, only to find himself disappointed.” 1  William 
Lauinger explains it as such: 
Dead Sea apples are apples that look attractive while hanging on the tree, 
but which dissolve into smoke or ashes once plucked. Accordingly, Dead Sea 
apple cases are cases in which someone desires something and then gets it, 
only to find himself disappointed. For example, Dennis might desire a certain 
job and then get it, only to find that he hates it. And, naturally, we can multiply 
examples here. Just think of any case in which someone wants something (to 
take a certain trip, or to join a certain club, or to be in a certain romantic 
relationship, or to take a certain class, etc.) and then gets it, only to find 
herself disappointed.2 
 
Surveying responses from idealized and actual versions of DST, Lauinger concludes 
that DST cannot adequately respond to DSAs.3 I agree with Lauinger that DSAs are a 
problem for DST, but not as generally as he suggests. DSAs are a problem for an 
                                                     
1 Lauinger, “Dead Sea Apples”, 325. DSAs first appeared in this context in Sidgwick, 
The Methods of Ethics, 110. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 327-343. 
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account of desire-satisfaction, which might be particularly attractive to subjectivists, 
one which draws a reliable connection between desire-satisfaction and feeling or 
judging ourselves to be happy. 
Instead, if DST is defined as (Kagan among others has defined it), a view 
wherein wellbeing consists in the attainment of desired states of affairs regardless of 
whether pleasure accompanies said attainment, then DSAs are not a problem for 
DST. Recently, Donald Bruckner adduced some empirical evidence in support of this 
suggested disconnection between desire-satisfaction and perceived happiness, 
before dismissing it as unproblematic for DST. To better understand Bruckner’s 
argument, we must separate two phenomena associated with desiring. Typically 
when A desires some state of affairs x 
(1) A has a positive feeling towards or a positive evaluation of life with x. A feels 
or judges himself to be happy when x. A feels unhappy or judges himself to 
be unhappy when not-x. Let us call this positive psychology associated with 
desire-satisfaction A’s subjective wellbeing. 
(2) A believes x to be better than not-x. In the absence of overriding desires or 
impediments, A would see to it that x obtains. Let us call this A’s preference. 
 
Bruckner concludes on the bassis of findings from empirical psychology that people 
often do not evaluate their lives positively when their desires obtain. 
Income and wealth are widely pursued, yet achievement of these goals does 
not cause people to evaluate their lives positively. People with certain 
desires—desires that depend for their satisfaction on the approval of others—
are less satisfied with their lives than those without such desires, and 
satisfaction of those extrinsic goals does not improve their views about how 
well their lives are going. In general, people are susceptible now to wanting 
for themselves later things that they will not later be glad to have. Perhaps, 
then, getting what one wants—as on the desire satisfaction theory—is not all 
that it is cracked up to be.4 
 
That is, empirical results “show that individuals are very susceptible to having desires 
such that satisfaction of those desires does not improve their own views about how 
well their lives are going”.5 This makes sense if Bruckner really means what I call 
preference. People often prefer to be wealthy and famous but do not actually 
experience subjective wellbeing when they are pursuing or when they attain wealth 
and fame. He points out that this invalidates subjectivist accounts, such as Peter 
                                                     
4 Bruckner, “Subjective Well-being”, 10. 
5 Ibid., 10. 
40 
 
Railton’s later work, which draws a necessary connection between preference-
satisfaction and subjective wellbeing. 6  However, Bruckner thinks that this is not 
technically a concern for DST. 
If one desires that p, that is, and p comes to pass, then the desire theorist is 
committed to saying that one’s well-being is thereby positively affected. But 
he is not committed to saying that one feels good about it being the case that 
p, or that p otherwise causes one to be in a positive subjective psychological 
state.7  
 
According to DST, “well-being consists in the satisfaction of desires, not in the 
experience of positive subjective psychological states.”8 Obtaining this state of affairs 
need not involve positive feelings or attitudes. Since the situation with DSAs is that 
post preference-satisfaction there is no increase in subjective wellbeing, DSAs are 
unproblematic for DST. 
But this definition of DST actually leads to metaphysical commitments that 
the subjectivist might find just as worrying as objectivism. A further distinction is 
helpful here. We have already distinguished two different mental states which are 
equally associated with desire: (1) preference for some state of affairs x and (2) the 
positive psychology which one might expect when x obtains. If the two are separable, 
then when A has some desire d, the target of d could be the state of affairs x or the 
positive psychology which one might expect when x obtains, although it might 
typically be both. In other words, when a DST states that A has attained d, it could 
mean either that: 
(1) The state of affairs x has obtained regardless of any accompanying positive 
psychology. 
(2) A has attained the positive psychology one might expect when x obtains 
regardless of whether the objective state of affairs corresponding to x has 
actually been obtained. 
 
To illustrate this, imagine that the mob is threatening Dave’s family. A renegade FBI 
agent offers Dave the following choice about what will happen at time t: 
Blue Pill: Dave will be brainwashed into believing that his family is living 
safely in witness protection. Actually, they will be gunned down at t+n. 
Red Pill: Dave will be brainwashed into believing they were gunned down. 
Actually, they will live safely in witness protection from t+n. 
                                                     
6 Ibid., 21. 





If Dave chooses the Blue Pill then he prefers the positive psychological state of 
believing that his family is safe. If he chose the Red Pill then he prefers the objective 
state of affairs wherein his family is safe. Of course, typically we do not have to 
choose as Dave does. Typically, when we desire something, we would like to obtain 
both the state of affairs and the accompanying positive psychology, and this is 
probably what usually happens when the desired state of affairs obtains. The point is 
that there are two separable targets of desire—so which is important qua wellbeing 
for DST? Since for Bruckner, preferring and attaining x regardless of the 
accompanying positive psychology is necessary and sufficient for our wellbeing, the 
Red and not the Blue Pill furthers Dave’s wellbeing. In the sense that Dave’s 
preference is for an objective state of affairs at the expense of feeling or judging 
himself to be happy, his preference goes against his subjective wellbeing. 
But holding that the Red Pill promotes Dave’s wellbeing is still compatible 
with subjectivism, so long as Dave’s endorsement of that choice remains the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the Red Pill constituting his wellbeing. However, 
DST then holds that some state of affairs x furthers A’s wellbeing so long as A 
preferred x at t even if A never experiences x’s satisfaction. Dale Dorsey calls this the 
distance allowance. 9  Famously, this locates our wellbeing even in the remotest 
preference. Take Kagan’s example of Primus who desires that the number of atoms 
in the universe is prime, and it happens to be, given the distance allowance Primus 
must be better off. Kagan, among others, finds this implausible.10 
There is also the further conundrum concerning when this wellbeing accrues? 
To take Dorsey’s more realistic example, suppose that Edmund desired to scale 
Everest at t. At t+n, Edmund no longer desired to scale Everest but had to anyway. 
Dorsey argues that given the importance of the endorsement constraint, Edmund’s 
wellbeing cannot be furthered at t+n because at that point he is alienated from scaling 
Everest. Dorsey also argues against concurrentism where the state of affairs must 
                                                     
9 Dorsey, “Desire satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal”, 155. 
10 Kagan, Normative Ethics, 37. See also Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 494. 
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coincide with the presence of the desire, because many of our desires are forward 
based. Furthermore, it is arbitrary to hold that the distance allowance allows states of 
affairs to affect our wellbeing across space but not across time. Finally, Dorsey 
settles on the future state of affairs at t+n furthering Edmund’s wellbeing in the past at 
t.11 If Dorsey is right, DST ends up committing to backward causation. I do not take 
the implication of backward causation or remote desires to be knockdown refutations 
of DST. The point is simply that many subjectivists reject objectivism because of 
metaphysical and epistemological worries. While DST does not have the same 
metaphysical and epistemological issues as objective value, commitment to 
backward causation and/or remote desires furthering our wellbeing makes DST 
metaphysically extravagant in its own way.  
In any case, objections against DST are well covered; there is no need to 
reinvent the wheel.12 Instead, the next two sections consider respectively two ways to 
justify preference-satisfaction’s privileged position in our wellbeing. The problem with 
remote desires is the lack of conscious impact on the agent’s psyche, person or 
circumstances. The endorsement constraint cannot even begin to be met because we 
are not conscious of anything to endorse. The DST theorist could argue, however, 
that these remote desires are nonetheless good for you simply because it is your 
preference that is satisfied. The first way then to justify the privileged position of 
preference-satisfaction is to posit a metaphysical and/or causal relation between your 
preferences and what essentially makes you you, and this relation imbues them with 
the property of constituting or tracking your level of wellbeing. This is to say that the 
essential constituents of the self are the same cognitive and conative parts at work in 
preference formation and hence our preferences have a special relation to our self 
and its wellbeing. For example, a car’s speedometer accurately tracks speed 
because it is causally connected via the drive cable to the car’s propulsion 
mechanisms. My Buddhist argument in the next section is that the cognitive and 
                                                     
11 Dorsey, “Desire satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal”, 156-161. 
12 See Heathwood, “Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism”, 540-547. 
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conative processes that underlie our preference formation process do not constitute a 
self, and so our preferences do not stand in any special relation to the self. 
 
3.3. Desire and the Buddhist doctrine of non-self 
 
This section bridges the two halves of the paper. In terms of the discussion 
thus far of conceptions of wellbeing, it argues against a possible metaphysical 
justification for the privileged position DST assigns to our desires. In preparation for 
the coming discussion of primarily Buddhist concerns, such as the roots and 
remedies of suffering, it introduces the Buddhist account of causation and cognitive 
psychology underlying the argument in the next section that preference-satisfaction is 
casually connected to suffering. While I will labour to make this account 
comprehensible with as little Buddhist doctrine as possible, some doctrine is 
inevitable. This is partly because the cognitive and conative processes comprising 
Buddhist psychology are embedded in a Buddhist account of the parts of a person 
known as the five aggregates (T5A) (skandhas). 13  T5A is itself employed in the 
context of a larger debate against opponents who hold that the self is permanent, that 
is, lasts at least a lifetime. The Buddhist theory of causation, the doctrine of 
dependent origination (paticcasamuppāda), is used to mount an objection against this 
view. Anything that answers the question of personal identity, that is, meets the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for preserving our integrity through time would 
have to last at least a lifetime.14 The argument from impermanence argues that each 
member of T5A is impermanent because each merely originates dependently from 
                                                     
13 Buddhist doctrine refers to them as parts because they are parts of a person 
insofar as a person is a mental thing. But the modern reader might find them easier to 
understand as mental processes. 
14 As Mark Siderits notes, permanent in early Buddhist philosophy meant eternal, but 
the argument is unaffected if permanent is read as ‘existing at least a whole lifetime’. 
Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy, 40. 
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the previous.15 Here’s the argument presented by Siderits with the first five premises 
naming the aggregates in turn. 
(1) Materiality is impermanent. 
(2) Sensation is impermanent. 
(3) Perception is impermanent. 
(4) Volition is impermanent. 
(5) Consciousness is impermanent. 
(6) If there were a self it would be permanent. 
(IP) [There is no more to the person than the five aggregates.] 
(C) Therefore there is no self. 16 
 
As you can see, an implicit premise is that T5A forms an exhaustive list of the parts of 
a person.17 The argument does not include a defence of the exhaustiveness claim 
and I am unaware of a satisfactory defence in the doctrine or elsewhere. In any case, 
that is unnecessary for our purposes. This is because the second to fifth aggregates 
are the sort of cognitive and conative processes that underpin our preferences, and 
the argument clearly states that these are impermanent and hence cannot constitute 
a self. 
According to the Buddhist doctrine of non-self (anātman), though it is 
tempting to consider ourselves as composed of an enduring mind, no such thing 
exists.18 The mind is simply a disjointed series of mental processes that operate and 
cease to operate in response to external or internal stimuli. Take for example, the 
experience of drinking some sweet Rosé. The luscious taste of the Rosé could 
                                                     
15 The Buddhist doctrine of non-self (anātman) is more philosophically and historically 
rich than I can and need to cover here. R. F. Gombrich and K. R. Norman among 
others have done extensive work on the philosophical background of the doctrine. 
See Gombrich, How Buddhism Began, 27-64. See also Norman, “A Note on Attā”. 
Norman explains that the doctrine developed in direct opposition to the Upanisadic 
concept of self (ātman) as permanent (nitya) and joyful (sukha). To those familiar with 
the Upanisadic self that which is characterized by impermanence (anitya) and 
suffering (duḥkha) by definition could not be self. Ibid., 19-22. Besides 
comprehensively explicating the doctrine’s philological heritage, Norman shows that 
the impermanent is defined antithetically to the permanent and is central to the 
argument for non-self.  
16 Ibid., 39, adapted. Instead of materiality and aggregates, Siderits uses the Sanskrit 
rūpa and skandhas. 
17 Ibid. 
18 “But, [monks], as to that which is called 'mind' and 'mentality' and 'consciousness'—
the uninstructed worldling is unable to experience revulsion towards it, unable to 
become dispassionate towards it and be liberated from it. For what reason? Because 
for a long time this has been held to by him, appropriated, and grasped thus: 'This is 
mine, this I am, this is my self:’ Therefore the uninstructed worldling is unable to 
experience revulsion towards it, unable to become dispassionate towards it and be 
liberated from it.” Bhikkhu Bodhi, Saṃyutta Nikāya, 595, adapted. 
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actually be dissected into momentary phenomena such as fleeting tastes, brief wafts 
of fragrance, shots of colour etc. This is actually a combination of the aggregates of 
materiality (rūpa) and sensation (vedanā). Materiality denotes the raw substances 
that constitute our world. These are fire, air, earth and water on an early Buddhist 
materialist view, and molecules, atoms and quantum particles in today’s science. 
Either way we do not experience the world as raw substances but sense data. The 
aggregate of sensations captures our involuntary categorization of sense data as 
pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. This categorization automatically lead to 
consciousness of certain perceptible properties, pleasant ones such as the 
sweetness and aroma of the wine, as well as unpleasant ones such as that annoying 
fly buzzing around. Whereas, sensations that are neither pleasant nor unpleasant, 
such as the ground underfoot, our breath, and the surrounding air, are unconsciously 
tuned out. To make sense of those sensations that we are conscious of, we 
synthesize elements that seem to share the same origin into a reified object. In our 
example, the colour, aroma, body, flavour and finish are synthesized into the concept 
of Rosé, which is then reified.19 This propensity of our mind to synthesize objects 
from scattered perceptible properties is the aggregate of perception (saṅṅā). 
Naturally following this perception of some object of value is the formation of some 
thought, consciously or sub-consciously, towards the realization of that value and the 
non-realization of disvalue or indifference. These object-directed thoughts, broadly 
construed to include mental states as diverse as interest, concentration, intention, 
preference, and so on, constitute the aggregate of volition (saṅkhāra).20 Inherent in 
volition towards something is the awareness of the object as something separate 
from oneself, something that one can have, as well as the simultaneous isomorphic 
awareness of the self as distinct from other objects. This subject-object awareness is 
                                                     
19  There are many parallels between the account given thus far and Kant’s 
transcendental idealism. See Guyer, The Cambridge Companion to Kant, 180-182. 
Notably, Buddhism resists the further step of positing a transcendental self that must 
exist to make sense of the disparate sensations.  
20 See Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, Visuddhimagga, 468-475, adapted. 
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the aggregate of consciousness (viṅṅāṇa).21 Thus, the five aggregates give rise to 
awareness of self, and the self’s preferring and not preferring, having or not having 
preferred or adverse objects. 
The above is a brief exposition of the dependent origination of T5A. 
Dependent origination broadly refers to the Buddhist theory of causation, which holds 
that the arising and continued existence of anything depends on myriad conditions.22 
As applied here, it refers to the sequential operation of our cognitive and conative 
processes in response to stimuli and their sequential ceasing of operation when the 
stimuli fades.  
Therein, [monks], the instructed noble disciple attends closely and carefully to 
dependent origination itself thus: 'When this exists, that comes to be; with the 
arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; 
with the cessation of this, that ceases: [Monks], in dependence on a contact 
to be experienced as pleasant, a pleasant feeling arises. With the cessation 
of that contact to be experienced as pleasant, the corresponding feeling-the 
pleasant feeling that arose in dependence on that contact to be experienced 
as pleasant- ceases and subsides. In dependence on a contact to be 
experienced as painful, a painful feeling arises. With the cessation of that 
contact to be experienced as painful, the corresponding feeling—the painful 
feeling that arose in dependence on that contact to be experienced as 
painful—ceases and subsides. In dependence on a contact to be 
experienced as neither-painful-nor-pleasant, a neither-painful-nor-pleasant 
                                                     
21 Here is this same process of the five aggregates giving rise to self as explained in 
the Pali canon. “With the life-continuum continuity occurring thus, when living beings’ 
faculties have become capable of apprehending an object, then, when a visible 
datum has come into the eye’s focus, there is impinging upon the eye-sensitivity due 
to the visible datum. Thereupon, owing to the impact’s influence, there comes to be a 
disturbance in [the continuity of] the life-continuum. Then, when the life-continuum 
has ceased, the functional mind-element arises making that same visible datum its 
object, as it were, cutting off the life-continuum and accomplishing the function of 
adverting. So too in the case of the ear door and so on.” Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, 
Visuddhimagga, 463. One’s life-continuum is one’s stream of consciousness. The 
arising of the “functional mind-element” is the functioning of the aggregate of 
consciousness as well as the arising of a notion of self. 
22 It also refers to a specific application of this theory of causation, which is commonly 
translated as the twelve links of dependent origination (nidānas). For an explanation 
of the twelve links see Geshe Lhundub Sopa, “Special Theory of Pratītyasamutpāda”. 
For a full doctrinal exposition see Nidānasamyutta in Bhikkhu Bodhi, Saṃyutta 
Nikāya, 533-620. Sue Hamilton has argued that paticcasamuppāda properly applies 
only to the general doctrine of dependent origination and the twelve links was a later 
development with the specific purpose of answering an implication of the general 
doctrine. “The dilemma in response to which it might have been given could have 
gone something like this: 'If the whole of saṁsāric experience is paticcasamuppāda 
(i.e. it consists only of conditioned, dependently originated, phenomena), if all that 
can be said about conditioned phenomena is that they are impermanent and 
unsatisfactory, and if absolutely all phenomena are selfless, how does what we 




feeling arises. With the cessation of that contact to be experienced as 
neither-painful-nor-pleasant, the corresponding feeling—the neither-painful-
nor-pleasant feeling that arose in dependence on that contact to be 
experienced as neither-painful-nor-pleasant ceases and subsides.23 
 
As the passage describes, without contact with something material, there cannot be 
sense data to be involuntarily categorized as pleasant or unpleasant or neither; 
without sense data categorized as pleasant or unpleasant, there are no perceptible 
properties to be reified into objects of value or disvalue. Without the perception of 
objects of value or disvalue, there can be no object-directed volitions, which are 
themselves necessary conditions for the distinction between self and object. 
Essentially, the dependent origination of T5A suggests that our cognitive and 
conative processes operate instantaneously and automatically in response to stimuli 
to create consciousness of self. Therefore, according to Buddhism, this 
consciousness of self has no basis in reality in the sense that there is no enduring 
mind that can meet the necessary and sufficient conditions for its persistence through 
time. There merely appears to be a permanent self because there is usually a 
continuous overlapping stream of stimuli. The exception that proves the rule is when 
we are in deep sleep or unconscious. When we search introspectively for this self, 
however, all we find are particular mental phenomena.24 Since our preferences, other 
volitions, and consciousness of self are merely processes that operate and cease in 
accordance with stimuli, they are merely transient phenomena which do not constitute 
a self. Since the cognitive and conative factors that underlie our preferences do not 
                                                     
23 Bhikkhu Bodhi, Saṃyutta Nikāya, 596-597. 
24 As James Giles observed, this argument parallels Hume’s in Book I of A Treatise of 
Human Nature. “Hume starts by pointing out that although some philosophers believe 
we are continuously aware of something we call the self, when we look to our 
experience there is nothing to substantiate this belief. We are never, says Hume, 
aware of any constant invariable impression that could answer to the name of self. 
What we experience, rather, is a continuous flow of perceptions that replace one 
another in rapid succession. "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself," 
says Hume, "I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, 
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time 
without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception." Within the 
mind, he continues, these perceptions "successively make their appearance; pass, 
re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations". And 
there is nothing to the mind but these perceptions. There is consequently never any 
simplicity within the mind at one time nor identity at two different times.” Giles, “The 
No-Self Theory”, 177. 
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constitute a self, our preferences do not hence stand in any special relationship to our 
wellbeing. 
 
3.4. Desire-satisfaction and suffering 
 
As mentioned earlier, a second way to justify the privileged position of 
preference-satisfaction is to posit a reliable connection between it and subjective 
wellbeing. Let us call this view Subjective Desire Satisfactionism (SDS).25 If this view 
is right, then DSA cases would be problematic. The example given was that of Dennis 
who desires to get into a prestigious law firm only to find himself miserable once 
employed.26 While Lauinger stops short of saying so, the problem for SDS is that 
DSAs do not just militate against a reliable connection between preference-
satisfaction and subjective wellbeing, DSAs also suggest that suffering could follow 
the attainment of one’s desires. After all, if subjectivism is right and what we are trying 
to do is to feel or judge ourselves to be happy, then following our preferences is the 
most obvious (if not the best) way to accomplish this. This would still be a viable 
strategy if the worst outcome is indifference, as long as one or more of your 
preferences lead to subjective wellbeing, you experience a net gain. But if 
preference-satisfaction could lead equally (or worse still reliably) to suffering, then this 
is no longer clearly a viable strategy. 
In the rest of this section I will draw from the first noble truth of Buddhism to 
explain why preference-satisfaction might equally be causally connected to suffering. 
                                                     
25  I have adopted Subjective Desire Satisfactionism because of the linkage to 
subjective wellbeing but also to credit Chris Heathwood. On his view “welfare consists 
in believing one is getting what one wants” and pleasure is “the subjective satisfaction 
of desire”. See Heathwood, “Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism”, 547-559. I 
suspect that upon further examination there are many parallels between Heathwood’s 
SDS and this simpler formulation or one is reducible to the other. Another relevant 
view is Peter Railton’s, wherein our perceived level of happiness is like an 
accelerometer (as opposed to a speedometer) because it tracks changes in our 
wellbeing based on how much our present preferences are being frustrated or 
satisfied. Railton, “The Problem of Well-Being”, 17-18. 
26 Ibid., 327. 
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Buddhism divides suffering into three varieties. There is the everyday variety of 
suffering (dukkha-dukkhatā), which includes visceral pain but also psychological 
suffering related to preference-frustration. We suffer when a preferred state of affairs 
does not obtain. We suffer when an adverse state of affairs obtains. We suffer when 
we encounter ageing, sickness and death as undesirable states. We suffer when, 
because of ageing, sickness and death, we are no longer able to enjoy preferable 
states. Prima facie, the everyday variety of suffering is closer related to preference-
frustration rather than satisfaction. Hence, I will concentrate on the other two varieties 
of suffering. 
This brings us to suffering due to the fleetingness of phenomena (SOF) 
(viparināma-dukkhatā). Everything preferable can and will pass, if nothing else just 
because we will. Built into this fleetingness is the pervasive risk, often actualized, of 
losing things that we have, will have or wish to have. When we attain our preferences, 
the risk of loss is itself painful. The more we treasure what we have attained, such as 
our wealth, our homes, our loved ones and our lives, the more painful is the thought 
of loss, let alone its actuality. In this sense preference-satisfaction is casually related 
to suffering. 
The last variety of suffering is related to conditioned phenomena (SOC) 
(saṅkhāra-dukkhatā), which means just about everything.27 According to the doctrine 
of dependent origination, multiple conditions must be met for any phenomenon to 
exist and persist. For instance, a single bottle of Rosé was brought about by 
favourable climate, painstaking cultivation, adequate finances, distribution networks, 
careful shipping etc. The continuation of our ability to enjoy it requires minimally the 
maintenance of our income, leisure time, safety and health. If this holds for a 
mundane bottle of wine, what about friendship, romance or tenure-track positions? 
                                                     
27  Saṅkhāra is synonymous with saṅkhāta, the Sanskrit term for conditioned 
phenomena, which is everything perceptible. Boisvert, The Five Aggregates, 93. 
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Nevertheless, the conditionality of phenomena is attendant with suffering only 
because of our volitions. 28  If we are indifferent towards some phenomenon, the 
conditions of its existence and survival have no practical import. But if we prefer to 
have it, we would prefer to have it when we like for as long as we like, yet we can 
neither will states of affairs into nor out of existence.29 Even though we may desire 
wholeheartedly, satisfaction is dependent on manifold circumstance. Sometimes they 
fall neatly; other times that one thing just never falls our way. This lack of control over 
our environment and the terms of preference-satisfaction is itself dissatisfactory and 
even painful.30  
But the Buddhist analysis goes deeper. When we have an object-of-desire, 
say a car, we do not hanker after an assembly of metals, rubbers and plastics. We 
have in mind something that makes us feel a certain way. That is, the object of our 
desire is a concept—shiny chassis, smooth leather, growling engine, proud emotion 
et al synthesized into a reified and distinct existence. It is not the conditioned reality, 
which is dependent on the constant maintenance of myriad factors (sometimes quite 
literally). The difference between the two is a source of suffering. The properties of 
the reified object-of-desire, which is essentially a concept, are timeless while the 
conditioned reality is impermanent. In reality, the exterior dulls, leather wears, engine 
grumbles and enthusiasm fades. Even if our purchase was initially satisfactory, 
continued satisfaction requires the maintenance of these characteristics or the 
downgrading of our expectations to reality. While the attainment of a reified object-of-
desire promises complete satisfaction, in reality there are only conditioned states of 
                                                     
28  Sankhāra also refers to the aggregate of volitions. As aforementioned, this 
encompasses all the aspects of our will that compel us toward desirables and away 
from undesirables. Ibid., 95-98. 
29 It is as Wittgenstein said: “Even if all we wish for were to happen, still this would 
only be a favor granted by fate, so to speak: for there is no logical connection 
between the will and the world, which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical 
connection itself is surely something that we could not will.” Tractatus, 374, cited in 
Kalupahana, “The Notion of Suffering”, 428. 
30 Tyson and Pongruengphant, “Buddhist and Western Perspectives on Suffering” 
links this variety of suffering to the psychological mechanisms that give rise to stress. 
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affairs which are subject to the dissatisfaction described above.31 The psychology of 
volitions is tied in this way to suffering. 
An objection could be raised that in these cases our meta-preference to 
satisfy our preferences as and when we like is frustrated. A Buddhist could reply that 
the attainment of this meta-preference is itself subject to SOF and SOC. This is 
because our ability to satisfy our preferences as and when we prefer is also transient 
and causally dependent on myriad conditions. Even a humdrum preference to 
practice counting depends on our continued survival, mental lucidity, lack of 
interruptions etc. A more difficult preference may also have more difficult conditions to 
satisfy for its corresponding meta-preference. If we attain our meta-preference in 
some instance, we may be exasperated when this ability is eventually lost or hindered 
elsewhere. Alternatively, if a meta-meta-preference for satisfying this meta-
preference as and when we prefer is introduced, it would be subject to a meta-meta-
meta-preference and complete preference-satisfaction would become embroiled in a 
vicious infinite regress. 
One could instead object that these cases simply point to preferences that 
are being frustrated such as our preference to continue to enjoy what we have 
attained. This is similar to the net loss objection that Lauinger rejects as a response 
to DSA cases. The basic idea is that vis-à-vis the attainment of some state of affairs x, 
our wellbeing is furthered to the extent that x satisfies some preferences and harmed 
to the extent that x frustrates other preferences. DSA cases, and the Buddhist linkage 
between preference-satisfaction and suffering, are explainable by x causing a net 
loss in wellbeing.32 Lauinger rightly notes that this makes a questionable assumption. 
As applied to the case with Dennis, the net loss response says that Dennis’s 
working at the firm is something that in itself adds to Dennis’s welfare. Indeed, 
                                                     
31 Thus the Anguttara Nikaya writes: “[Monks], there are these four inversions of 
perception, inversions of mind, and inversions of view. What four? (1) The inversion 
of perception, mind, and view that takes the impermanent to be permanent; (2) the 
inversion of perception, mind, and view that takes what is suffering to be pleasurable; 
(3) the inversion of perception, mind, and view that takes what is non-self to be self; 
(4) the inversion of perception, mind, and view that takes what is unattractive to be 
attractive. These are the four inversions of perception, mind, and view.” Bhikku Bodhi, 
Aṅguttara Nikāya, 437-438, adapted. 
32 Lauinger, “Dead Sea Apples”, 329-330. 
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the claim here is that, inasmuch as Dennis’s desire to work at the firm (full 
stop) is fulfilled, his welfare is advanced. Yet, unless one has a prior 
commitment to the DF [desire fulfilment] theory, there is no good reason to 
accept this claim. After all, Dennis is miserable at the firm. Dennis and his job 
are not at all suited or fit for each other. Thus, unless one is already a DF 
theorist, one will inevitably conclude that working at the firm is not in itself 
adding to Dennis’s welfare. DF theorists need to explain why this natural 
conclusion is mistaken.33  
 
In other words, unless one already takes DST to be true, there is no reason to accept 
the net loss response. 
To sum, nothing in this section rejects the intuitive causal connection 
between preference-satisfaction and subjective wellbeing, the argument is rather that 
preference-satisfaction could equally be causally connected to suffering. For example, 
Harry’s earlier preference for heroin is causally related to his earlier subjective 
wellbeing but it is also related to his later destitution and contradictory preference to 
be drug free. This later preference is then causally related to frustration from his 
inability to will his mind and body to be addiction free. In this way, the multiple 
conditions that need to be fulfilled, such as adequate willpower, social support and 
nutrition, are frustrating. This frustration is causally related to how “successfully” 
Harry satisfied his previous preference for heroin. Even if he manages to satisfy this 
preference to lead and treasure a healthy happy drug-free life, the maintenance of 
this cherished life would be threatened by the fleetingness of his life and its 
constituent parts. In other words, we are not denying that the satisfaction of Harry’s 
drug preference (D) at t1 is causally responsible for his subjective wellbeing (W) at 
some point t2. That is, if D had not obtained at t1, W would have not obtained at t2. 
The point is rather that the satisfaction of D at t1 is also causally responsible for his 
suffering (S) from SOF and SOC at t3. Equally, if D had not obtained at t1, S would not 
have obtained at t3. Therefore, the Buddhist would say that a view like SDS which is 
founded on a reliable connection between preference-satisfaction and subjective 
wellbeing solely concentrates on the subjective wellbeing that accompanies the 
satisfaction of a preference but ignores attendant suffering.  
                                                     
33 Ibid., 330. 
53 
 
This poses a problem for SDS as a species of subjectivism, according to 
which living the good life is simply doing what makes us feel or judge ourselves to be 
happy. This typically means living according to our preferences. But if some of our 
preferences lead to suffering instead (and we do not want to turn to objectivism due 
to its justificatory problems) then how do we live in accordance with doing what 
makes us feel or judge ourselves to be happy? To help out SDS, we need a way of 
life that helps avoid attendant suffering. In the next chapter I argue that Hongzhou 








Suppose that you find the objectivist’s claim that certain things are good for 
you even if you do not endorse them to be metaphysically and epistemologically 
worrying, and so you prefer subjectivism wherein the good life is simply what makes 
you feel or judge yourself to be happy (subjective wellbeing). Let us assume that the 
most obvious (if not the best) way to do what makes you feel or judge yourself to be 
happy is to follow your preferences. In other words, you may hold this to be true: 
(1) Preference satisfaction is the most obvious (if not the best) way to attain 
subjective wellbeing. 
 
Implicit within (1) would be the following subjectivist view  
(2) Subjective Desire Satisfactionism (SDS): Preference satisfaction is reliably 
connected to subjective wellbeing.  
 
SDS still presents a viable strategy if at worst preference-satisfaction results in 
indifference. If one or more of your preferences have happy endings, you still 
experience a net gain in subjective wellbeing. It is a problem for SDS if  
(3) Preference satisfaction is causally connected to suffering from the 
fleetingness of phenomena (SOF) and suffering from the conditionality of 
phenomena (SOC). 
 
The goal in this final chapter is to use Chan Buddhism’s way of life to help SDS avoid 
said suffering, and connect (though not by necessity) the attainment of subjective 
wellbeing with a plausibly morally permissible way of life. 
Section 4.2 describes a particular mental state which avoids SOF and SOC. 
When you act along the lines of ‘I want some steak’, such goal-directed reasoning 
invokes consciousness of a self, of certain interests possessed by this self, and a 
certain object that fulfils these interests. By aligning one’s self-interests with a 
particular object in this way, one is said to be attached to this preference. It is not 
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pliable to change in a way that would help avoid SOF. Instead if one’s mind were in a 
free flowing state, where states of affairs enter and exit our consciousness without us 
dwelling for a moment on any one, then even if one perceives an object, one does not 
make a value judgement. Without value judgements, one is firstly not attached to 
certain states of affairs over others. Secondly, one does not form object-directed 
volitions and does not suffer from the gap between objects-of-desire, which are 
concepts reified, and conditioned reality. Therefore, one avoids SOC and SOF in this 
mental state—the non-abiding mind (無住心) of Chan. 
Having described the mental state that prevents SOF and SOC, Section 4.3 
describes the way of life that leads expediently to the non-abiding mind. This is 
necessary because the non-abiding mind is essentially a spontaneous state where no 
volitions arise. As such, it is at least potentially counter-productive (if not unfeasible) 
to deliberately intend to be spontaneous and without volition. Because of this paradox 
of spontaneity, we need a way of life that leads expediently to the non-abiding mind. 
According to the Hongzhou School of Chan, this is the way of life conventionally 
known as the ordinary mind is the way (OMW) (平常心是道), which involves singular 
attention to our daily tasks. 
However, OMW allows for a multitude of different lives. Someone could pay 
singular attention to his or her daily routine of irrational or immoral activities. While the 
definition of subjectivism does not allow a necessary condition which rules this out, I 
can point out a possible justification for why Chan monks nonetheless adhere to strict 
codes of personal morality and social etiquette. Using the habitual practice of 
impartial benevolence as an example, I argue that there is something about such 
moral conduct that is well-suited to be an expedient means to the non-abiding mind, 
whereas the pursuit of one’s selfish interests over the interests of others is in a way 
antithetical to the non-abiding mind.1 If we attain subjective wellbeing through the 
                                                     
1 I do not claim that Chan monks habitually practice impartial benevolence (or that 
they do not), I am merely claiming that the habitual practice of impartial benevolence 
has certain properties that makes it well suited to be an expedient means to the non-




non-abiding mind, and attain the non-abiding mind through the habitual practice of 
impartial benevolence, then a plausibly non-immoral and non-trivial way of life is 
causally responsible for meeting the subjective conditions of wellbeing. Thus, 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 provide reasons for someone who accepts the above three not 
uncontroversial but also not metaphysically and epistemologically extravagant claims 
to live in a plausibly moral way for purely prudential reasons without any claims 
involving objective value. 
 
4.2. The non-abiding mind and the avoidance of suffering 
 
In this section, I further examine how the fleetingness and conditionality of 
phenomena affect preference-satisfaction so as to cause suffering and how we can 
avoid this suffering. Suffering due to the fleetingness of phenomena (SOF) arises 
predominantly when we are conscious of preferences that are threatened or 
frustrated by change. Some distinctions are necessary here. There are conscious and 
non-conscious preferences. For example, since Milo was forced upon Stanley by a 
friend and having taken Milo for granted for years, he might not be aware of a 
preference for the dog’s continued companionship. Similarly preference-satisfaction 
could be conscious or non-conscious. When we have a preference for some state of 
affairs x, we could be aware or unaware of x obtaining. The same could be said for 
preference-frustration. Even if one was aware of preference-satisfaction or frustration, 
one may not perceive any impact on one’s subjective wellbeing. For example, one 
may read that scientists have confirmed that the universe does not have a prime 
number of atoms as one would prefer, but discover that one’s feelings and evaluation 
of one’s life are not adversely affected. For the purposes of SDS, which posits a 
reliable connection between preference-satisfaction and subjective wellbeing, what is 
ultimately important about conscious preference-satisfaction or frustration is its 
perceived impact on the agent’s wellbeing. 
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Applying these distinctions, we can see that both conscious and unconscious 
preferences may lead to SOF. Should Milo fall life-threateningly ill, Stanley might 
nonetheless be upset despite not realizing that he has a standing preference for 
Milo’s company. One would not suffer though if one were unaware that a change in 
the status quo frustrates an existing preference, or if one were aware of such a 
change but does not perceive any negative impact. For instance, if Stanley believed 
that it is just as well that Milo passed on, he would not be upset. In this scenario, 
Stanley could have had a simultaneous preference change in favour of being Milo-
less, been unaware of any preference-frustration or aware of it but perceived no 
negative impact on his wellbeing. We have thus identified three ways in which we 
might avoid SOF. 
The case is more complicated for suffering due to the conditionality of 
phenomena (SOC). According to Buddhism, all phenomena are conditioned. They all 
require a multiplicity of causes to arise and persist. If SOC is simply due to the 
conditionality of phenomena then it should apply to all our preferences insofar as they 
relate to any kind of phenomena. Hence, this kind of suffering is often referred to as 
“pervasive suffering” in Buddhist discussions. But if we take this suffering to be an 
inescapable fact of our existence then the Buddhist truth of the cessation of suffering 
is not something that can take place in our lifetime; rather, suffering would only cease 
when we in some sense cease to exist. This state is nirvana without residue 
(nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa), which is the state of highest awakening that is attained after 
an enlightened one’s physical death and that also brings about the complete 
cessation of their personal cycle of life-rebirth-death and hence suffering. Since there 
is no longer feeling and evaluation, we cannot speak of subjective wellbeing. 2 Hence, 
the conception of nirvana in Theravāda Buddhism may not be germane to our current 
discussion.3 In Mahāyāna Buddhism of which Chan is conventionally considered a 
                                                     
2  Park, How Buddhism Acquired a Soul, 101. For discussion of Indian Buddhist 
conceptions of nirvana both with and without residue, see Chapters 4 and 5. 
3 Theravāda Buddhism is not germane only insofar as it is committed to a particular 
conception of nirvana without residue. However, as Jonathan Silk has argued, labels 
like Theravāda, Mahāyāna and Chan are nebulous. It is unclear what historical group 
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variety, the cessation of suffering does not require the cessation of our existence but 
merely the cessation of defilements in our mind.4 That is, a certain insight is required. 
Since SOC is caused by the gap between reified objects-of-desire and actual 
conditioned reality, we need the twofold insight that objects-of-desires are really 
reified bundles of sensations and also that our obtaining and continued enjoyment of 
the corresponding state of affairs is conditioned upon myriad factors, many of which 
are beyond our control. This interpretation holds that suffering is pervasive because 
people are pervasively in error (that is they consciously or sub-consciously possess 
false beliefs) about these two facts. This error gives rise to the aggregate of volitions 
(sankhāra), and to SOC (saṅkhāra-dukkhatā) (as covered in Section 3.4).5 That is, we 
naturally synthesize perceived qualities, such as the fragrance, sweetness, texture of 
what we are drinking, into a distinct concept, like Rosé. That concept is then reified 
into an object-of-desire, which our volition could latch onto. This latching is 
instantaneous but its fulfilment is conditioned. That is, Rosé as a concept is not 
transient and does not require myriad factors to arise and persist, whereas securing 
the desired drinking experience requires certain conditions to be met and if we prefer 
to continue to have the same experience these conditions must continue to be met. 
Furthermore, the reified object-of-desire formed from our previous experiences, like a 
joyful night by the river, is coloured by those experiences, such that when we desire 
Rosé we expect a specific kind of sweetness and fragrance. If we do not recognize 
that these expectations are mentally built into the reified object rather than part of real 
states of affairs then we potentially set ourselves up for disappointment if these 
                                                                                                                                           
they designate and what were their distinguishing features. Silk proposes re-
imagining Buddhism as a grid composed of clusters of substantively related sutras. A 
label such as Mahāyāna demarcates one such cluster, but its boundaries are fluid 
depending on how the sutras are interpreted. Silk, What is Mahāyāna Buddhism. 
Given such a fluid definition, it is impossible to definitively rule out any particular 
strain of Buddhism as completely unsuitable for our purposes. Moreover, I make no 
claim that Chan is superior to any strain of Buddhism in any way, be it handling SOF 
and SOC or reconciling subjectivism and objectivism. 
4 See Geshe Tashi Tsering, The Four Noble Truths, 36-38.  
5 See Hamilton, Identity and Experience, 69-70. 
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idiosyncratic pleasant qualities cannot be found again.6 Thus, consciously possessing 
false beliefs about the conditioned nature of phenomena, or thinking or behaving in a 
way that betrays error about the conditioned nature of phenomena at some 
subconscious level, causes SOC. Whereas if we understood that objects-of-desires 
are really concepts reified and also that our obtaining and continued enjoyment of 
desired states of affairs are conditioned upon myriad factors, we might see 
phenomena as they truly are—just conditioned states of affairs—and hence behave 
accordingly. 
At least that is the straightforward way of explaining how insight into the 
conditioned nature of phenomena prevents SOC. However, if the synthesis of 
sensations into reified objects-of-desire is a natural cognitive process, then the above 
twofold insight into the true nature of reality may not halt the cognitive chain that gives 
rise to SOC. That is, even if one possesses the insight, one may still be disposed to 
forming value judgments and seeking out objects-of-desire. Thus, how this insight 
prevents SOC still bears explanation. 
Let me first cite and explain the relevant passage in the Platform Sutra: 
If you have awakened to the prajñā samādhi, this then is no-thought. What is 
no-thought? The Dharma of no-thought means: even though you see all 
things, you do not attach to them, but, always keeping your own nature pure, 
cause the six thieves to exit through the six gates. Even though you are in the 
midst of the six dusts, you do not stand apart from them, yet are not stained 
by them, and are free to come and go. This is the prajῆā samādhi, and being 
free and having achieved release is known as the practice of no-thought.7 
 
Prajñā (般若 ) is commonly translated as wisdom, which in this context means 
realizing that objects are empty of any inherent existences, but are instead reified 
                                                     
6 Fred Feldman has an example of a DSA case (see chapter 3 for an explanation of 
such cases) which illustrates how we mentally build expectations into our reified 
objects-of-desire and set ourselves up for disappointment. “A beer-lover once had 
some beer in a strange bar. It had a weird and wonderful taste. He really enjoyed it. 
For many years he wanted to find that beer again, but never found it. He kept looking. 
He wanted to taste that weird and wonderful taste. After many years of searching, he 
wandered into a bar in a foreign country. Lo and behold, they had the beer. He 
wanted to taste that strange taste again and so he ordered a glass. He drank. It 
tasted the same, but he no longer enjoyed it. It was a disappointment. In fact, he was 
pretty unhappy about the whole thing.” What is Happiness, 67. 
7 Yampolsky 1967, 153. 「悟般若三昧即是無念。何名無念。無念法者。見一切法不著
一切法。遍一切處不著一切處。常淨自性。使六賊從六門走出。於六塵中不離不染。
來去自由。即是般若三昧自在解脫名無念行。」TPSD, T48:2007, 340c19-23. 
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bundles of sensations. Samādhi (三昧) is basically a state of mental tranquillity. When 
we are in this state of mental tranquillity, even though we continue to see myriad 
phenomena, our volition does not latch onto them as objects-of-desire. 8  This is 
because even though the senses and mental perception (the aforementioned six 
gates 六門) continue to cause conscious activities (seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, 
feeling, and discerning concepts; the aforementioned six thieves 六賊 ), these 
activities do not steal our attention. Rather, they pass as naturally as they came—
being replaced with other sense data and so on. In this way, even though we do not 
shut out but rather continue to perceive sense data (sight, sound, smell, taste, touch, 
and concepts; the aforementioned six dusts 六塵), we simply let them pass out of our 
minds naturally and do not dwell on any to form value judgements.9 Since no value 
judgements are formed, these sense data do not stay in our minds in the form of a 
desired object and do not in turn make us act as directed by our volitions. Hence, this 
is also known as a state of no-thought, in the sense that it is free from volitional or 
object-directed thoughts (無念). Therefore, the suggestion is that insight into the true 
nature of reality is somehow equivalent to practicing no-thought by maintaining the 
state of tranquillity. 
Nevertheless, how insight fits into the picture remains unclear, since it is the 
tranquil state that prevents the formation of value judgements. One could train 
oneself or accidentally happen to practice no-thought without possession of this 
insight. Conversely, even with such insight, it does not seem to follow that one would 
therefore lose the disposition to make value judgments. But this duality presupposes 
a certain picture of insight and practice. If we picture insight as a justified true belief 
that does not necessarily influence our disposition to behave in any particular way, 
                                                     
8 Yampolsky translated “一切法” as “all things”. I think phenomena is a more accurate, 
and more popular translation now, for 法  as it avoids ‘things’ association with 
reification. Ibid. 
9 As we are seeking to avoid SOC and SOF, judgments are only problematic insofar 
as they lead to suffering. This opens the possibility for certain judgments, such as 
aesthetic judgments, to actually abet or even produce enlightenment. Nonetheless, 
the classical commentaries on this passage have not directly suggested this, so I 
shall leave this argument for someone else to make. 
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while practice is simply acting in a particular way, which may not be informed by any 
particular beliefs, then there is an apparent divide between insight and practice.  
Chan Buddhism, however, has a thicker conception of insight and practice.  
Good friends, how then are meditation and wisdom alike? They are like the 
lamp and the light it gives forth. If there is a lamp there is light; if there is no 
lamp there is no light. The lamp is the substance of light; the light is the 
function of the lamp. Thus, although they have two names, in substance they 
are not two. Meditation and wisdom are also like this.10  
 
Something is not a lamp without a light-producing function, and light production 
cannot take place without the body of the lamp. The existence of one is 
interdependent on the other and in this sense each is one way that we see the lamp-
light phenomenon. In reality, the two are not completely separable.11 Analogously, 
there are many ways to sit in stillness, what defines the practice of no-thought (most 
saliently Chan-style mindfulness meditation) is that its function is to produce insight 
into the true nature of reality. Correspondingly, according to Chan, the insight cannot 
have been realized (or one might say in this case embodied) if we do not behave 
accordingly. Thus, insight and practice are not intended as distinct phenomena—
passive knowledge versus uninformed activity—rather they represent two sides of the 
same phenomenon. One might explain it as such, we have an insight P iff we know 
that P and are disposed to behave in a certain way compatible with belief that P. 
Diametrically, we practice P iff we behave in a certain way P that is compatible with 
our knowledge that P. 
That said, both the claim that (A) the practice tends to produce the insight 
and (B) that the insight cannot be fully realized without the practice are questionable. 
Among the two, I think that (A) is more dubious. After all (B) could be made true by 
definition, if S has knowledge that P without action compatible with P, one could 
simply reject that S has fully realized that P. But I think that (B) is more than mere 
tautology, it is plausible that if S adequately appreciates the true nature of certain 
phenomena, then S would act accordingly. For instance, children that finally realize 
                                                     
10 Yampolsky 1967, 137. 「善知識。定惠猶如何等。如燈光。有燈即有光。無燈即無
光。燈是光知體。光是燈之用。即有二體無兩般。」 TPSD, T48:2007, 338b26-28. 
11 McRae, Seeing through Zen, 43-44. 
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where their Christmas presents come from would stop writing letters to the North Pole. 
Aside perhaps from a comprehensive psychology experiment testing Chan-style 
meditation’s correlation to seeing the world as states of affairs rather than reified 
objects-of-desire, there is no obvious way to validate (A). In the rest of this section, I 
shall simply seek to prove that practicing no-thought disposes one to behave in a 
manner compatible with having such knowledge. 
Again, I will first explain the relevant passage in the Platform Sutra, before 
explaining how the mental state equivalent to the practice of no-thought prevents 
SOF and SOC. This mental state is known as the non-abiding mind (無住心), wherein: 
Successive thoughts do not stop; prior thoughts, present thoughts, and future 
thoughts follow one after the other without cessation. If one instant of thought 
is cut off, the Dharma body separates from the physical body, and in the 
midst of successive thoughts there will be no place for attachment to anything. 
If one instant of thought clings, then successive thoughts cling; this is known 
as being fettered. If in all things successive thoughts do not cling, then you 
are unfettered. Therefore, non-abiding is made the basis.12 
 
Clinging to a thought is to direct one’s attention to some thought, such as this 
argument’s details. To illustrate, imagine that this paper is the extent of one’s field of 
awareness. One’s awareness could be strung along by the lines on the page, such 
that one’s awareness moves in step with the argument. Thus, even though one’s 
visual and mental perceptions continue to cause the conscious activities of seeing 
and discerning concepts; no single perception monopolizes our attention. In this 
sense, we are not fettered to any perception. Each passes as freely as it came—
being replaced with other perceptions and so on. Instead, if, suddenly, one’s attention 
latches onto a premise and actively seeks out counter-examples with the intention of 
testing and disproving the argument, then one’s attention is pulled from a non-
judgemental general awareness of the states of affairs and fettered to this line of 
                                                     
12 Yampolsky 1967, 138. 「念念不住。前念念念後念。念念相續無有斷絕。若一念斷
絕法身即是離色身。念念時中。於一切法上無住。一念若住念念即住名繫縛。於一切
法上念念不住即無縛也。以無住為本。」TPSD, T48:2007, 338c5-10. The Platform 
Sutra explained that this doctrinal goal of no-thought and the state of being amidst 
myriad phenomena but not latching onto any is founded on being non-abiding. “In this 
teaching of mine, from ancient times up to the present, all have set up no-thought as 
the main doctrine, non- form as the substance, and non-abiding as the basis.” 
Yampolsky 1967, 137-138. 「我此此法門。從上已來。頓漸皆立無念為宗無相為體無
住為本。」TPSD, T48:2007, 338c2-4. 
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thought. This fettering began with the direction of one’s attention to a particular 
perception, in this case one premise in a wider argument. One can tell a similar story 
with a sensory experience, such as our aforementioned experience of the Rosé. 
When one forms a value judgment about a particular perception, such as a particular 
moment of flavour, one’s attention is diverted from a non-judgemental general 
awareness of the state of affairs as they change from moment to moment. Chan calls 
this the reality (真如) of the world. That breakaway moment from the reality of this 
world kick-starts the cognitive chain which leads to SOC. The judgment of value 
captures our attention, triggers the automatic perception of an object behind that 
value, and an object-directed thought towards the realization of value. Preferences 
that locate value in this way in a reified object-of-desire would feature that 
aforementioned gap between concept reified and conditioned reality, and hence lead 
to SOC. 
This fettering of the mind to a train of thought aimed at realizing some object 
of value, essentially goal-directed reasoning, also causes our preferences to be 
vulnerable to SOF. As Jenann Ismael and John Pollock explain, a sense of self is 
necessary to be a goal-directed agent in complex and changing environments. 
Suppose you design a robot that only passively navigates the world, things happen to 
it but it never seeks to actively make things happen. It may need the spatio-temporal 
indexicals here and now to form beliefs about the current state of the world, but not a 
sense of who it is and what it can do. It does not need “de se designators”—I, me, 
myself. But once the robot has a goal, it needs to know what is its current state, what 
it can do and what effects these actions will have vis-à-vis that goal. In other words, 
goal-directed practical reasoning like ‘I want to eat steak’ requires some de se 
reasoning about what is my current state and what I can do to get some steak.13 
Since goal-directed practical reasoning like ‘I want steak’ involves the 
concept of a self, an object external from the self, and volition towards that object, it 
unites three types of consciousness. First is a consciousness that there is indeed a 
                                                     
13 Ibid., 46-52. 
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self, which as per the argument from impermanence (covered in Section 3.3) 
Buddhism does not believe exists. Second is a consciousness that this self has 
certain interests. Third is a consciousness that these interests are furthered by this 
particular object. In this way, when we engage in goal-directed practical reasoning, a 
conscious link is created between our personal wellbeing and the attainment of some 
object. Since we are conscious of this preference and its part in our personal 
wellbeing, we are not just aware if the preferred state of affairs does not attain, we 
are aware that our personal wellbeing is frustrated. In terms of our earlier distinction, 
we are conscious of preference-frustration and also perceive negative impact on our 
wellbeing. As such, we are also less likely to give up on this preference 
spontaneously or effortlessly. Buddhism calls this attachment. Thus, preferences 
which we are attached to are more susceptible to SOF. They are also vulnerable to 
SOC because they involve object-directed volitions and hence invoke the gap 
between reified object-of-desire and conditioned reality. 
Conversely, when the mind is non-abiding, one’s mind moves freely from 
phenomenon to phenomenon without dwelling on any. Even if one experiences 
pleasant sensations and cannot help but perceive an object causing these pleasant 
sensations, so long as one’s mind remains non-abiding, one does not direct another 
thought towards that object. Since two thoughts are not held together to create an 
object-directed thought, volitions that consciously locate value in some reified object-
of-desire do not arise. Without such location of value, the mind is not fettered to a line 
of thought directed at this goal. Without goal-directed practical reasoning, there is 
also no corresponding conscious link between personal wellbeing and the attainment 
of the object-of-desire. Instead if the mind simply moves from one state of the world 
to another without dwelling for a single instant to allow any judgement then there 
would be no space for us to be conscious of any frustration, and even if such 
consciousness did pop into our head it would be quickly replaced by the next 
perception, rather than followed by judgement that our wellbeing has been negatively 
impacted. However, the minute this flow is cut by dwelling on a thought then our 
enlightened state ceases, which is what is meant by the Dharma body (法身) being 
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cut off from the physical body.14 Thus, maintaining a non-abiding mind causes one to 
act compatibly with the insight that objects are merely concepts reified, and so 
prevents SOF and SOC.  
But we introduced Chan to provide a way of life that helps SDS avoid 
attendant suffering. Chan’s non-abiding mind does so but it is a state of mind. 
Preference-satisfaction has also disappeared. The other problem is that the non-
abiding mind is essentially a spontaneous state where no volitions arise, but is it not 
paradoxical to deliberately intend to be spontaneous and without volition? Thirdly, the 
objectivist might point out that if the non-abiding mind is essentially a state of 
spontaneity, what prevents someone from simply living according to his immoral, 
irrational or vacuous impulses? These are the issues I will turn to next. 
 
4.3. The paradox of spontaneity and reasons to be moral 
 
In this section I will describe the actual way of living that leads to and 
maintains the non-abiding mind. I argue that because of what I will describe as the 
paradox of spontaneity, one cannot directly aim at the non-abiding mind. Instead, one 
needs some way of life that is both an expedient means to freedom from attachment 
and not itself prone to attachment.15 Hongzhou Chan’s way of life known as ordinary 
mind is the way, and the habitual practice of impartial benevolence could both do so. I 
will first reconstruct both the Chan problem of and solution to the paradox of 
spontaneity before explaining my interpretation of the logic behind the solution. 
Finally I close by tying it back to our discussion of wellbeing. 
                                                     
14「若一念斷絕法身即是離色身。」TPSD, T48:2007, 338c7. 
15 The barest interpretation which would suffice for our purposes of x is an expedient 
means to y would be x is a sufficient condition for y, given that y has certain 
difficulties. Of course, it is a woefully inadequate explanation of the Buddhist notion of 
expedient means (upāya, 方便). For an explanation which befits the current context 
see Poceski, Ordinary Mind as the Way, 163-168. 
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Hongzhou Chan practitioners, such as Baizhang Huaihai (百丈懷海), were 
aware that forcefully willing or gradually cultivating a non-abiding mind is at least 
potentially counter-productive and at worst unfeasible because volitional action is 
antithetical to the non-abiding mind. 
When expounding the Dharma to ascetic monks (śramaṇa) you should know 
that they have been fully ordained for the practice of śila, dhyāna and prajñā; 
if you again insist on their performance thereof, your talk is inopportune and 
is also called affected speech. So if your listeners are ascetic monks you 
should deal with pollution arising from (basic) purity, and should teach them 
to keep from dualities such as is and is not, etc, and from (the concept of) 
practice and realization as well as from this very idea of so keeping away.16  
 
Śramaṇas include pre-Buddhist ascetics and Buddhist monks who follow ascetic 
practices. These monks have renounced everything worldly and devoted themselves 
to proper conduct (śila), meditation (dhyāna) and wisdom (prajñā). Baizhang points 
out that the principal obstacle to a non-abiding mind for them is not insufficient 
religious practice or a lack of doctrinal understanding, but a fixation on these as 
steadfast paths to purity. If they are fixated on whether a doctrine or practice is or is 
not conducive to enlightenment, their mind is fettered to the conscious goal of a self 
that is free of attachment. They are thus stuck in the paradox of spontaneity: in their 
fixation on freeing themselves of attachments, they make the non-abiding mind itself 
an object of attachment, and thus fail to achieve the non-abiding mind. 17 The paradox 
also entails that if one desires to perpetually reside in the non-abiding mind, then the 
non-abiding mind again becomes an object of attachment and the course of action is 
                                                     
16 Luk 1974, 63. 「若於沙門前。說他沙門已受白四羯磨訖。具足全是戒定慧力。更向
他與麼說。名非時語。說不應時。亦名綺語。若是沙門。須說淨法邊垢。須說離有無
等法。離一切修證。亦離於離。」BZER, X68:1315, 6a16-19. 
17 The venerable Śubhakarasiṃha said: ‘Thou novice practitioner. One who having 
much fear of giving rise to volitions and arousing karmic intentions, arrests breathing 
to seek as well as to attentively guard against volitions so as to achieve 
enlightenment. Even as you seek to progress, you will never obtain it.’ 「輸波迦羅三
藏曰。汝初學人。多懼起心動念罷息進求[11]而專守無念以為究竟者。即覓增長不可得
也。」MSGM, T18:917, 945a22-24. The above excerpt from the (probably fictional) 
debate between Śubhakarasiṃha and Jingxian, representing esoteric Buddhism and 
Chan Buddhism respectively, is a sectarian criticism of Chan style mindfulness 
meditation. Such meditation seeks to unfetter the mind, but the criticism goes that this 
sort of disciplined meditation is itself a preoccupation. 
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again self-defeating.18 On the other hand, a monk telling himself to suddenly awaken 
is akin to telling yourself to be spontaneous now! In making this demand, he is using 
volitional force to push himself into a mental state that is empty of volition. In principle, 
one could will up to a point and then abandon volition, but too little force would not 
break the psychological barriers against the non-abiding mind (such as attachment to 
some object-of-desire), while too much volitional force would foil the non-abiding mind. 
It is like Sisyphus pushing a gigantic round boulder up a steep hill and forcing it to 
balance on the point. Thus, neither sudden awakening nor gradual cultivation leads 
straightforwardly to the non-abiding mind, some expedient means is necessary 
instead.19 
Given that fixating on how to cultivate enlightenment puts one in a state of 
goal-directed reasoning, which is antithetical to the non-abiding mind, the founder of 
the Hongzhou Lineage Mazu Daoyi (馬祖道一) recommends putting aside deliberate 
cultivation and simply applying the non-abiding mind in the context of everyday life. 
This is the way of life known as ordinary mind is the way (OMW).  
The Way needs no cultivation; just prevent defilement. What is defilement? 
When with a mind of birth and death one acts in a contrived manner, then 
everything is defilement. If one wants to know the Way directly: ordinary mind 
is the Way! What do I mean by “ordinary mind?” [It is a mind] that is devoid of 
[contrived] activity, and is without [notions of] right and wrong, grasping and 
rejecting, terminable and permanent, worldly and holy. The [Vimalakīrti] 
scripture says, “Neither the practice of ordinary people, nor the practice of 
sages, that is the Bodhisattva's practice.” Just now, whether walking, 
standing, sitting, or reclining, responding to situations and dealing with people 
as they come: everything is the Way.20 
 
According to Jia Jinhua, ““Way” designates both the Buddhist path and enlightenment. 
Ordinary mind is enlightenment itself, which means intellectual non-commitment to 
                                                     
18 Chan is opposed to fixation on quietude. For example, the Zongbao edition of the 
Platform Sutra states that: “if you empty your minds and sit in quietude, this is to 
become attached to the emptiness of blankness” McRae 2000, 29. 「第一莫著空，若
空心靜坐，即著無記空。」TPSZ, T48:2008, 350a28. 
19 I have neither the space nor the wherewithal to adequately explain the complex 
sudden awakening versus gradual cultivation debate in Chan, which I have alluded to 
here. For further explanation see Poceski, Ordinary Mind as the Way, 194-198. 
20 Poceski, Ordinary Mind as the Way, 183. 「道不用脩。但莫汙染。何為汙染。但有
生死心。造作趨向。皆是汙染。若欲直會其道。平常心是道。何謂平常心。無造作。
無是非。無取捨。無斷常。無凡無聖。經云。非凡夫行。非聖賢行。是菩薩行。只如
今行住坐臥。應機接物。盡是道。」MZER, X69:1321, 3a12-16. 
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any oppositional thinking and discrimination, and also all the spontaneous activities of 
daily life” 21  Oppositional thinking and discrimination is essentially making value 
judgments by discerning opposites or dichotomies in states of affairs, such as 
grasping and rejecting (basically desirable and undesirable) or worldly and holy 
(basically suitable and unsuitable for enlightenment). If we simply engaged in 
whatever arises in daily life without dwelling on any phenomenon, we would have no 
need for such dichotomies and our mind would be spontaneous and non-
discriminating—non-abiding.  
Since OMW is literally mundane, we can see why Mazu said it is not “the 
practice of sages”, but how is it different from the unenlightened “practice of ordinary 
people”? This was posed to Dazhu Huihai (大珠慧海). When asked what effort he 
makes towards enlightenment, Dazhu answered:  
“When I’m hungry, I eat; when tired I sleep.” 
Q: “And does everybody make the same efforts as you do, Master?” 
“Not in the same way.” 
Q: “Why not?” 
“When they are eating, they think of a hundred kinds of necessities, and 
when they are going to sleep they ponder over affairs of a thousand different 
kinds. That is how they differ from me.”22  
 
Mario Poceski explains that OMW does not solely refer to the end goal, the non-
abiding mind, it is also a way of life, “which involves single-minded endeavor to 
maintain a detached state of non-dual awareness”.23 By this, Poceski does not mean 
strong-minded pursuit of the non-abiding mind but singular focus on the task at hand 
which maintains a state of non-judgement general awareness. When Dazhu eats and 
sleeps, he does not do so robotically while his mind is fettered to lines of thought 
concerning what needs to be done to achieve his goals. Instead, Dazhu is fully 
present in his daily affairs. He maintains a non-judgemental general awareness of the 
coming and going of state of affairs in his perception as he goes about his daily life. In 
                                                     
21 Jia, Hongzhou School, 68 
22 Blofeld 1969, 95-96. 「有源律師來問。和尚修道還用功否。師曰。用功。曰如何用
功。師曰。饑來喫飯困來即眠。曰一切人總如是同師用功否。師曰。不同。曰何故不
同。師曰。他喫飯時不肯喫飯。百種須索。睡時不肯睡。千般計校。所以不同也。」
HHRD, T51:2076, 247c1-6. 
23 Poceski, Ordinary Mind as the Way, 183. 
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other words, Dazhu approaches his daily tasks as desirable in their own right rather 
than necessities to be completed only in consideration of some greater goal. 
Why singular attention to daily affairs in particular? We can approach a range 
of activities as desirable for their own sake, most obviously activities already pursued 
for their own sake. One might argue that these are attachments, since something 
desired for its own sake is something we find inherently valuable. However, daily 
affairs also regularly involve oppositional thinking and attachment. For example, 
people commonly find certain foods desirable and others detestable, and hence 
attach to food as sensual pleasure. Addressing this, Huangbo Xiyun’s (黄檗希運) 
record states: 
Thus, there is sensual eating and wise eating. When the body composed of 
the four elements suffers the pangs of hunger and accordingly you provide it 
with food, but without greed, that is called wise eating. On the other hand, if 
you gluttonously delight in purity and flavour, you are permitting the 
distinctions which arise from wrong thinking. Merely seeking to gratify the 
organ of taste without realizing when you have taken enough is called 
sensual eating.24  
 
When you sensually savour a veal cheek, you consciously enjoy the tastes and 
flavours, and allow the pervasive mistake of reifying concepts to guide your 
preference-satisfaction. Acting in this manner singles out this object ‘veal cheek’ from 
other objects as an instantiation of this particular type of value, deliciousness perhaps. 
 Instead, one might respond naturally and automatically to hunger, maintain a general 
awareness of sensations without dwelling on any to pass judgement, and hence is 
aware of and responds automatically to satiation. Thus, one eats wisely because one 
does not allow the mind to dwell on any part of the eating experience and synthesize 
sensations into a reified object-of-desire. That is, one eats as if one possesses the 
insight that in reality there are no objects, only states of affairs.25 
                                                     
24 Blofeld 1958, 39. 「有識食有智食。四大之身飢瘡為患。隨順給養不生貪著。謂之智
食。恣情取味妄生分別。惟求適口不生厭離。謂之識食。」HBCC, T48:2012A, 
380c25-28. 
25  Thus, according to Huangbo’s record, one prevents the mistake of making 
distinctions between this and that “by realizing that, though you eat the whole day 
through, no single grain has passed your lips.” Blofeld 1958, 131.「問。如何得不落階
級。 師云。但終日喫飯。未曾齩著一粒米。」HBWL, X68:1315, 22c23-24. This 
means realizing that the object ‘rice’ does not actually exist but is merely a concept 
reified. An important caveat is to take this as merely offering a sufficient but not 
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One way to make sense of the above is to borrow from how some scholars 
have explained Lao Zi’s (老子) account of automaticity. The account distinguishes 
between desires of the eye and stomach. 26  Desires of the eye are directed at reified 
objects-of-desire, which are formed by the synthesis of particular sensations. These 
particular sensations are marked out for synthesis and desire because one’s focus (or 
mind’s eye) is narrowed to these particular states of affairs as relevant results for 
preference-satisfaction out of all the states of affairs possible. Like the synthesis of 
particular sensations into the reified object-of-desire veal cheek demarcates only 
those particular sensations as relevant to our preference-satisfaction. Whereas 
desires of the stomach are automatic responses to bodily needs that do not arise 
from evaluation, just as an infant does not need goal-directed practical reasoning 
when it is hungry. It simply cries, eats and stops automatically. Desires of the 
stomach being automatic biological processes have natural satiation points, such as 
being full or no longer sleepy, whereas desires of the eye being conscious products 
of volition are potentially insatiable and hence more prone to attachment.27 Although 
we must bear in mind Huangbo’s warning that even desires of the stomach can be 
fulfilled in a sensuous or ‘desire of the eye’ manner. The idea is that if we do not 
approach our daily needs as sensual indulgences but simply allowed their inherent 
automaticity to rule, they would not naturally become objects of attachments. 
                                                                                                                                           
necessary means to maintaining the non-abiding mind in daily life. One could equally 
imagine another Buddhist asking one to focus on the chain of causes and conditions 
that lead to one’s eating the veal cheek to develop loving-compassion towards the 
calf. 
26 “The five colors make man's eyes blind; The five notes make his ears deaf; The five 
tastes injure his palate; Riding and hunting make his mind go wild with excitement; 
Goods hard to come by serve to hinder his progress. Hence the sage is for the belly 
not for the eye. Therefore he discards the one and takes the other.” 五色令人目盲，
五音令人耳聋，五味令人口爽，驰骋田猎令人心发狂，难得之货令人行妨。是以圣人
为腹不为目，故去彼取此。Lau, Tao Te Ching, 16-17. For a full account of the Daoist 
desires of the stomach and eye see Ziporyn, Ironies of Oneness and Difference, 139-
197. 
27 Hence, when the Record of Linji commands monks to “just act ordinary”, examples 
of desires of the stomach are listed. “Followers of the Way, the Dharma of the 
buddhas calls for no special undertakings. Just act ordinary, without trying to do 
anything particular. Move your bowels, piss, get dressed, eat your rice, and if you get 
tired, then lie down. Fools may laugh at me, but wise men will know what I mean.” 
Watson 1993, 31. 「道流。佛法無用功處。秖是平常無事。屙屎送尿著衣喫飯。困來
即臥。愚人笑我。智乃知焉。」LJRD, T47:1985, 498a16-18. 
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That is, one explanation for why Hongzhou Chan singles out daily affairs for 
the practice of no-thought is because their inherent automaticity makes it possible to 
start them without goal-directed reasoning, singular attention during the task ensures 
we do not form value judgements, and if we allow their inherent automaticity to 
continue to guide us naturally to satiation, we do not crave after completion as well. 
Thus, Chan’s singular attention to daily affairs is equivalent to practicing no-thought 
and disposes one to behave in a manner compatible with insight into the true nature 
of reality, and hence leads expediently to the non-abiding mind. 
We can now summarize Chan’s problematizing and solution of the paradox of 
spontaneity. Chan’s solution to SOF and SOC is the non-abiding mind but directly 
aiming to make one’s mind non-abiding would make the non-abiding mind an object-
of-desire and attachment. In other words, they cannot have a conscious preference 
for their mind to be non-abiding. Their answer is to put aside their preference for the 
non-abiding mind and aim at some other end X instead, where X has the 
aforementioned inherent automaticity, which prevents X from itself being an object of 
attachment. 28  The logical structure of this intricate interweaving can be thus 
summarized: 
(1) Freedom from attachments is an expedient means to the end of suffering. 
(Section 4.2)  
(2) One’s mind is non-abiding iff it is free of attachments. (Section 4.2)  
(3) The non-abiding mind is an expedient means to the end of suffering (From 
1 and 2). 
(4) Consciously desiring for one’s mind to be non-abiding is counterproductive 
to the non-abiding mind. (The paradox of spontaneity). 
(5) Singular attention to X as if X were desirable for its own sake frees one’s 
mind of other conscious objects-of-desire, including the non-abiding mind, 
and hence frees one of other attachments. 
(6) X’s inherent automaticity prevents X itself from being an attachment. 
(7) Singular attention to X as if X were desirable for its own sake frees one from 
attachments. (From 5 and 6) 
(8) Singular attention to X as if X were desirable for its own sake is for one’s 
mind to be non-abiding. (From 2 and 7) 
(9) Singular attention to X as if X were desirable for its own sake is the 
expedient means to the end of suffering. (From 3 and 8) 
 
The exegesis above argues that singular attention to daily life, because of its inherent 
automaticity, could be this X. This is because single-mindedness treats routine affairs, 
                                                     
28  My discussion of Chan’s paradox of spontaneity draws inspiration from 
Slingerland’s Daoist account in Effortless Action, 107-117. 
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like eating and sleeping, as desirable for their own sake, yet these mundane matters 
also have natural satiation points that prevent us from attaching to them as insatiable 
objects-of-desire. 
However, the above account is a sufficient rather than necessary means to 
the non-abiding mind (and the non-abiding mind is itself sufficient but not necessary 
for preventing SOC and SOF). Furthermore, singular attention to daily life allows for 
the same sort of lives that objectivists find problematic. For example, someone who is 
singularly attentive to his or her daily routine of maliciousness could conceivably 
achieve the non-abiding mind for the same reasons listed above. Insofar as this habit 
forms a part of his or her daily affairs, this is also following OMW, albeit in a broad 
sense. Following OMW in the narrowest sense would be to pay singular attention to 
mundane affairs, such as eating and sleeping. I cannot rule out these sorts of cases. 
As discussed in section 2.5, the very definition of subjectivism makes it conceptually 
difficult (if not impossible) to sustain constraints against certain sorts of lives. I will 
touch on the failings and merits of my approach in closing. In the remainder of this 
section, I shall instead point out why the pursuit of one’s selfish interests over those 
of others is antithetical to the non-abiding mind, and hence fits badly into OMW, 
whereas the habitual practice of impartial benevolence harmonizes with OMW and 
the non-abiding mind. 
While Chan allows for many expedient means to the non-abiding mind, 29 and 
despite the anti-precept rhetoric in Chan texts, the everyday life of Chan monks still 
involves strict and routine adherence to precepts governing personal morality and 
social behaviour.30 Even the Record of Linji which apparently rejects the rules and 
                                                     
29  For a discussion of the various expedient means to the non-abiding mind in 
Hongzhou Chan, see Poceski, Ordinary Mind as the Way, 163-168. 
30 The large part of Chan texts are addressed to monks and Chinese literati familiar 
with Buddhist doctrine. They are intended as expedient means to the removal of the 
primary obstacle to this audience. Resultantly, many Chan texts contain strong anti-
meditation and anti-precept rhetoric, which gives rise to the appearance of 
antinomianism. Bielefeldt, “Ch’ang-lu Tsung-tse Tso-Chan I”, 129-147. In reality, 
precept keeping is still a focal point of Chan monastic life to the extent that several 
manuals were specifically written to provide strict rules governing personal morality 
and social behaviour. Foulk, “Chanyuan Qinggui”, 287-307.  
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practices of Buddhism, 31  emphasizes Linji’s full ordination in the precepts and 
assiduous study of the rules of monastic life. 32  This acclimatization to precept 
following provides the mechanism by which something akin to (or passable as) moral 
conduct is internalized and incorporated in daily life.33 While the same internalization 
of precepts cannot be expected in lay followers, social norms and conventional 
virtues, such as the habitual practice of impartial benevolence, could similarly be 
incorporated into daily life. There are certain characteristics about such conduct 
which make it particularly suitable to be an expedient means to the non-abiding 
mind.34  
I will begin with the observation that furthering one’s selfish interests over 
those of others involves a conscious distinction between one’s self and others, the 
consciousness of one’s individual wellbeing, and consciousness of something that 
furthers this wellbeing. Oppositional thinking is also involved insofar as one draws a 
distinction between my interests and your interests. As explained in the preceding 
section, preferences where one’s self-interests are consciously and rigidly linked to 
                                                     
31 “You say, 'I observe all the six rules and the ten thousand practices.' In my view all 
that sort of thing is just creating karma.” Watson 1993, 43. 「爾言六度萬行齊修。我見
皆是造業。」LJRD, T47:1985, 499b9-10. Linji’s alleged rejection of the six Buddhist 
perfections and ten thousand practices actually emphasizes that reliance on 
cultivation and precept as steadfast routes to enlightenment turns them into objects-
of-desire and hence into attachments. 
32 “The Master's personal name was I-hsuan and he was a native of Nan-hua in 
Ts'ao-chou. His surname was Hsing. As a child he displayed unusual qualities, and 
when he grew older he was known for his filial devotion. Later, when he shaved his 
head and received full ordination in the precepts, he took up residence in the lecture 
halls, assiduously studying the vinaya and reading widely and diligently in the sutras 
and treatises.” Watson 1993, 127. 「師諱義玄。曹州南華人也。俗姓邢氏。幼而頴異。
長以孝聞。及落髮受具。居於講肆。精究毘尼。博賾經論。」LJRD, T47:1985, 506c8-
10. 
33 I am not claiming to explain the importance or the development of precepts in Chan. 
There are many important historical, political and simply practical reasons behind the 
organization of Chan monastic life and the writing of Chan monastic code. For some 
of the socio-political developments behind this see Schlütter, How Zen became Zen, 
31-54. I am merely offering a possible justification for strict adherence to codes of 
personal morality. 
34 Perhaps, this is why the authors of the Zongbao edition of the Platform Sutra 
included in Huineng’s exhortation to the Wei court this very utilitarian sounding line: 
“in one’s daily actions one must always practice the dissemination of [broad] benefit 
[for others]” McRae 2000, 41, adapted. 「日用常行饒益」TPSZ, T48:2008, 352c5. 
McRae rendered 饒益 as benefit but this actually ignores the adjective 饒 which in 
this context would mean something close to abundant. Thus, the authors would 
actually have had in mind either generous or broad benevolence.  
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the attainment of some particular object are attachments.35 That is, these desires are 
not pliable to change and involve the gap between the reified object-of-desire and the 
conditioned reality.  
Perhaps, the converse is true when one acts to further the ends of others. As 
mentioned, Ismael and Pollock have mentioned that de se designators (I, me, myself) 
are required for an agent to engage in goal-directed practical reasoning—to think 
about how to achieve something in the world. If we reverse this line of thought, then 
one’s practice of benevolence will most effectively lead to abstinence from notions of 
self when it is habitual and impartial. Intentional practices require more goal-directed 
practical reasoning. Habitual practices require less of such practical reasoning and 
hence lesser conscious consideration of one’s goals. Whereas impartial practices by 
definition make no reference to the recipient’s position relative to oneself, and hence 
even if goal-directed practical reasoning were involved, the propositions would be 
more likely compared to a partial practice to be free of indexical elements. If one 
practices habitual and impartial benevolence in this way, then one abstains from self-
other distinctions. As a result one also abstains from considerations of how such 
practice stands in relation to one’s goals, such as enlightenment. In this sense, 
habitual practice of impartial benevolence avoids oppositional thinking and goal-
directed reasoning, and is a good candidate for freeing oneself of other attachments. 
However, one might object that if one is merely acting habitually, and there is 
no volition, how can there be preferences to satisfy? Recall though that A prefers X 
so long as A believes x to be better than not-x, and that preferences could be 
                                                     
35 A student asked Huangbo, what if one was malicious like Kaliraja—an Indian king 
who in Buddhist lore tortured Gautama Buddha in one of his past lives. “The holy 
sages tortured by him represent your own mind, while Kaliraja symbolizes that part of 
you which goes out seeking. Such unkingly behaviour is called lust for personal 
advantage. If you students of the Way, without making any attempt to live virtuously, 
just want to make a study of everything you perceive, then how are you different from 
him? Blofeld 1958, 123. 「師云。僊人者。即是你心。歌利王。好求也。不守王位。謂
之貪利。如今學人。不積功累德。見者便擬學。與歌利王何別。」 HBWL, X68:1315, 
22a8-10. Kaliraja cutting up the Buddha is explained as one’s covetous nature 
damaging one’s enlightened nature. This covetousness is taken as definitive of the 
pursuit of personal profit (謂之貪利). When one pursues personal profit, one has a 




conscious or unconscious.36 Imagine that you are watching an engrossing thriller on a 
red-eye flight, and the stewardess serves you some foreign-looking dish, which you 
accept. You think nothing of it at the time, but when the friend that receives you asks 
about the inflight-dining, you realize that you actually liked it. I suggest that this is a 
case of a hitherto unconscious preference. In other words, you believed that it was 
better to have the exotic delicacy than not, maybe not generally but at least for that 
time and place, except that you were not aware of your own preference at the time of 
consumption. This thin conception of preference, which allows for unconscious 
preferences and hence unconscious preference-satisfaction, would allow for 
preference-satisfaction even when one acts habitually and not out of volition, and/or 
one’s mind is non-abiding.37 In this section, we have just added the further constraint 
against acting on egocentric preferences, or preferences that aim to further one’s 
selfish interests over those of others. Holding a thin conception of preference still 
allows one to have a great many preferences to be satisfied, such as an unconscious 
preference for the people we interact with not to suffer on account of our actions, 
which is fulfilled through the habitual practice of impartial benevolence. 
The question is whether one’s benevolent preferences can be non-conscious 
and would not become attachments themselves. My proposal is that empathetic 
responses have the same inherent automaticity as other desires of the stomach like 
eating and sleeping. In other words, empathy is built into most humans such that the 
suffering of others generates an involuntary affective response. Making this empirical 
case begins with evolutionary evidence that group selection processes played a 
particularly strong role in human evolution. As a result we are programmed to be pro-
social via mechanisms like empathetic and altruistic responses.38 The case is further 
supported by neuro-scientific evidence that perception of suffering leads to somatic 
                                                     
36 It might be helpful to think of the distinction between conscious and unconscious 
preferences as mapping onto the distinction between occurrent and dispositional 
beliefs. 
37  That said, this does not mean that conscious preferences imply conscious 
satisfaction or that unconscious preferences imply unconscious satisfaction. One may 
prefer to be under a blanket when asleep, or feel a sense of conscious preference 
satisfaction but remain unsure which preference was fulfilled.  
38 Sober and Wilson, Unto Others, 132-158. 
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and autonomic (that is largely subconscious) responses.39 Evidence suggests that 
these responses are autonomic because we literally feel their pain, that is, we 
experience their pain via the same affective pain circuits as our own.40 Hence, just as 
we might respond autonomically to an experience of our own pain by stopping it, we 
might also respond autonomically to the experienced pain of others by stopping it. 
These autonomic responses, like other desires of the stomach, have an in-built 
satiation point— when the point stops. 
More importantly, the primary obstacle to an autonomic response to another’s 
pain is the inability to experience another’s pain as if it were one’s own and 
mindfulness meditation which happens to be central to the Chan way of life also 
happens to be very effective in this regard. Studies have shown that mindfulness 
meditation enabled practitioners to better experience the inner state and suffering of 
others, as well as increased self-reported empathy scores.41 Psychologically this may 
be due to reduction in self-centredness, which is our natural tendency to pay greater 
attention to our own feelings.42 As we have seen, a key tenet of Chan doctrine and 
practice is the removal of consciousness that there is a self that exists apart from 
things and people, which if successfully practiced should greatly reduce or even 
eliminate self-centredness. Another psychological factor might be increased 
awareness of feelings and sensations. Research suggests that bodily awareness of 
one’s own experiences is an important precondition for empathy. Experienced 
mindfulness meditators have been found to have increased grey matter volume and 
activation in the insula cortex, which is associated with bodily awareness.43 This is not 
                                                     
39 Preston and de Waal, “Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases”, 1-20. 
40 Hein and Singer, “I feel how you feel”, 153-158. 
41 Davies and Hayes, “What Are the Benefits of Mindfulness?”, 202. 
42 Hein and Singer, “I feel how you feel”, 156. 
43 Hölzel et al., “How Does Mindfulness Meditation Work?”, 541-542. The insular 
cortex (IC), particularly the anterior IC, is exceptionally important in bodily awareness, 
empathy, compassion and other interpersonal phenomena like fairness and 
cooperation. See Lamm and Singer, “The role of anterior insular cortex in social 
emotions”, 579-591. Compassion meditation was shown to be particularly effective in 
causing heightened physiological changes in the IC in response to the suffering of 
others. Ibid., 582. Together the evidence suggests that changes in the IC might be a 




the place to give a detailed account of the psychology and neurology relating 
mindfulness and empathy. Nonetheless, I hope that these last two paragraphs have 
opened the possibility that such empathetic responses are actually autonomic and 
that Chan doctrine and practice are well suited to improving our capacity and 
propensity to make such responses. 
4.4. Concluding caveats 
 
It would be apposite to close by revisiting the debate with which we begun. In 
the Happy Immoralist, Steven Cahn pushes us to consider Fred who is resolutely 
immoral but celebrated, pampered and pleased. If our feelings and attitudes towards 
our life are necessary and sufficient conditions for our lives to be good for us, then 
Fred indeed lives a terribly good life.44 In the Unhappy Immoralist, Jeffrie Murphy 
argues that once we adopt a fuller conception of the good life, then it becomes clear 
that Fred lacks many necessary conditions.45 This in a nutshell is the debate between 
subjectivists and objectivists about wellbeing. Subjectivists, mostly due to 
metaphysical and epistemological concerns about objective value, take our 
endorsement as a necessary and sufficient condition for something to constitute our 
wellbeing. This opens the door for happy immoralists to have good lives to the 
chagrin of objectivists. My goal was to find a way of life that helped a truly subjective 
account of wellbeing, SDS, handle happy immoralist cases without abandoning 
subjectivism. 
To do so I needed to ensure that SDS was an admissible subjective theory of 
wellbeing. Since SDS held that preference-satisfaction is reliably connected to 
subjective wellbeing, it is blighted if preference-satisfaction is causally connected to 
suffering as the first noble truth of Buddhism suggests. Therefore I introduced Chan’s 
non-abiding mind, and the way of life that gives rise to this mental state, to give us a 
way of life that allows us to follow our preferences while avoiding the attendant 
                                                     
44 Cahn, “Happy Immoralist”. 
45 Murphy, “Unhappy Immoralist”. 
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suffering described by Buddhism. I argued also that the habitual practice of impartial 
benevolence fits well with this way of life—the ordinary mind is the way (OMW). Since 
the habitual practice of impartial benevolence helps us avoid suffering and thereby 
attain subjective wellbeing, a way of living that is plausibly non-trivial and non-
immoral becomes causally connected to the conditions for wellbeing of an admissible 
subjective theory. 
Nevertheless, this is not a necessary connection nor can we make it so. We 
could follow our preferences and thereby attain subjective wellbeing without the 
habitual practice of impartial benevolence. If the habitual practice of impartial 
benevolence forms part of our daily life, then singular attention to it would be in a 
broad sense following OMW. But we could also follow OMW in the narrowest sense 
by paying singular attention to mundane affairs like eating and sleeping. Given the 
right objectivist account, such as an Aristotelian or Ruist account (touched on briefly 
in Section 2.2 and 2.4 respectively), OMW would be insufficient for wellbeing. Given 
that OMW merely emphasizes active engagement in one’s daily affairs, and does not 
expressly advocate typical objectivist goods like virtue, knowledge, or 
accomplishment, an objectivist might even find OMW trivial. To keep subjectivism 
intact we cannot build other non-subjective necessary conditions into our theory. 
Thus, if the objectivist’s discomfort has to do with the very sufficiency of endorsement 
then the argument here would not be satisfactory. But it is by definition impossible to 
build a truly subjective theory that satisfies objectivism. Rather, if the objectivist is 
concerned with establishing a link, however tenuous, between subjective wellbeing 
and a plausibly non-trivial, non-immoral way of life then Section 4.3 might be 
gratifying. 
This is not to say that subjectivists would find OMW and/or the habitual 
practice of impartial benevolence wholly satisfactory. I have offered two overlapping 
but separable paths (although I have not claimed they exhaust all possibilities) by 
which we could follow our preferences to subjective wellbeing. But these paths are 
constrained to preferences concerning our daily affairs and the suffering of others, but 
our preferences are much more varied and wide-ranging. Again the problem is that 
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subjectivism is (in this case not axiomatically but in spirit) opposed to a one-size-fits-
all way of life that is good for us given the uniqueness of our situations and 
dispositions (as discussed in Section 2.4 and 2.5). Chances are for any given way of 
life there will be someone for whom it is a bad fit. In this case, it could be someone 
who has larger, more varied appetites and is apathetic about the suffering of others. 
Still this does not leave us where we began. The lack of a necessary 
connection between the habitual practice of impartial benevolence and subjective 
wellbeing is both bane and boon. A necessary connection while satisfying to the 
objectivist also requires a more robust defence of said connection, which may bother 
those who prefer a theory of wellbeing with less extravagant metaphysical and 
epistemological commitments (perhaps due to some of the concerns surveyed in 
Section 2.4). Conversely, the prescription here only rests on our agreement vis-à-vis 
the causal connection between preference-satisfaction and suffering, between the 
non-abiding mind and the prevention of said suffering, and between the habitual 
practice of impartial benevolence and the non-abiding mind. If we indeed agree that 
said practice helps us avoid suffering, and in this way attain subjective wellbeing, 
then we have well and truly tied that which is good for us with the good of others 
without making any presumptions about knowing what is good for us regardless of 
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